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I. Introduction
Arbitration, as reflected through the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA),1 is “simply a matter of contract between the parties.”2 This
oft-cited “fundamental principle”3 reflects an indisputable
“axiom,”4 but one which the Circuit Courts of Appeals have failed
to apply consistently. Courts diverge as to whether a party
resisting arbitration must show prejudice in order to prove that
its opponent waived its right to arbitrate.5 This Note
demonstrates not only that prejudice is unnecessary, but that the
waiver doctrine itself is conceptually flawed. In its place, this
Note proposes a multifactor judicial framework derived from
generally applicable contract law principles—a reasonableness
test.
The standard conception is that “parties agree to use
arbitration—to use private judges rather than public court judges
to resolve their disputes—because arbitration is a process that
improves upon the court system for dispute resolution.”6 Indeed,
arbitration is a private,7 alternative adjudicatory forum to which
one gains access by contract.8 Although the “default forum of
dispute resolution is litigation,” parties can “override the
1. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2011).
2. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).
3. Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010).
4. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648
(1986).
5. Gary Born, Implied Waiver of the Right to Arbitrate, KLUWER
ARBITRATION BLOG (Aug. 30, 2011), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/
011/08/30/implied-waiver-of-the-right-to-arbitrate/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2011)
(framing the issue as whether “prejudice on the part of a resisting party is
necessary for an opposing party’s right to compel arbitration to be deemed
waived”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
6. Christopher R. Drahozal, Why Arbitrate? Substantive Versus
Procedural Theories of Private Judging, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 163, 163 (2011)
[hereinafter Drahozal, Why Arbitrate].
7. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum
Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813, 816 (2008)
[hereinafter Drahozal, Arbitration Costs] (“Arbitration is private dispute
resolution.”).
8. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There a Flight
from Arbitration?, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 76 (2008) (noting that parties can be
compelled to arbitrate only “if they have agreed to do so . . . by entering into an
arbitration agreement”).

1612

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1609 (2012)

litigation default rule” by contracting to do so.9 This notion,
however, begs the question: Why would a party contractually
relinquish its right to seek legal recourse in court? The
justifications for doing so are ubiquitous,10 but can be reduced to
a veritable cost–benefit analysis.11 If the projected benefits of
arbitration outweigh those of litigation in relation to the costs
surrounding each regime, the parties will choose to arbitrate.12
Herein lies the critical contractual freedom provided by
arbitration. Parties attempting to curb the costs and diminish the
risks appurtenant to their contractual arrangements13 can tailor
arbitral procedures designed to accomplish those very
objectives.14
Typically, the arbitration clause—a binding agreement
entered into before a dispute arises—is the key which grants
access to the arbitral forum and denotes the parties’ arbitral
9. See Drahozal, Why Arbitrate, supra note 6, at 165.
10. See, e.g., id. at 163 (“[A]rbitration may be preferred to litigation because
it is cheaper and faster; because it enables parties to pick a decision maker (the
arbitrator) who is an expert in the field; or because it provides a neutral
forum . . . among other reasons.”); George A. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem
in International Commercial Arbitration, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2012) (“[A]ll
participants . . . have an interest in ensuring that arbitration delivers the
various advantages associated with it, notably speed, economy, informality,
technical expertise, and avoidance of national fora . . . .”).
11. See Drahozal, Arbitration Costs, supra note 7, at 833 (noting the
importance of “[c]omparing the costs of arbitration with the costs of
litigation . . . in evaluating the efficiency of the two processes”).
12. See infra Part II (discussing the cost–benefit analysis conducted by
parties in determining whether to arbitrate or litigate certain disputes).
13. This Note will not confront the numerous social issues surrounding
consumer and employment arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion. Such
issues have been the subject of intense debate among scholars and
commentators, and are outside the parameters of this Note. Avoiding this issue,
however, has allowed this Note to focus squarely on the doctrinal underpinnings
of arbitration in formulating an alternative to the waiver doctrine. Focusing on
the doctrine surrounding this issue mirrors the Supreme Court’s approach in
addressing other arbitral issues. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) (finding a state law which held class arbitration
waivers unconscionable preempted by the FAA, and stating that although the
“rule is limited to adhesion contracts, . . . the times in which consumer contracts
were anything other than adhesive are long past”).
14. See Drahozal, Why Arbitrate, supra note 6, at 177 (noting that parties
can devise procedures to fit “the type of contract or perhaps even the type of
dispute” they foresee as potentially arising from that contract).
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rights.15 Title 9, § 2 of the United States Code governs the
validity and enforcement of such agreements.16 The Supreme
Court recently provided a concise articulation of § 2’s substantive
mandate: “FAA [§ 2] . . . places arbitration agreements on an
equal footing with other contracts . . . and requires courts to
enforce them according to their terms. Like other contracts,
however, they may be invalidated by generally applicable
contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.”17
The FAA also establishes procedural mechanisms by which
federal courts implement § 2’s substantive mandate.18 Section 3
requires courts to stay litigation, pending arbitration of any
claims falling within the scope of the parties’ arbitration
agreement.19 Further, § 4 provides a coercive measure, allowing
courts to compel arbitration on behalf of any party “aggrieved” by
its opponent’s refusal to arbitrate.20
Overall, the FAA embodies “a broad [c]ongressional
expression of social policy and, in a barebones statute, a
delegation of decisionmaking responsibility to the judiciary.”21 As
such, courts play an essential role in “policing” the arbitral
process, safeguarding the key benefits that arbitration provides
and which parties expect to derive.22 This often entails ensuring
that arbitral proceedings are initiated expediently and
15. See id. at 165–66 (explaining the difference between “pre-dispute” and
“post-dispute” arbitration agreements). Although post-dispute arbitration
agreements are possible, “the substantial majority of arbitration proceedings
arise out of pre-dispute agreements” and, as such, are the sole focus of this Note.
Id. at 165.
16. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2011) (“Validity, irrevocability, and enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate.”).
17. Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
18. See id. (describing how, procedurally, FAA §§ 3 and 4 “implement § 2’s
substantive rule”).
19. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2011) (stating that if a party files suit in court, the
court “shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until
arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement”).
20. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2011) (stating that, upon the application of a party to
a valid arbitration agreement, “the court shall make an order directing the
parties to proceed to arbitration”).
21. Alan Scott Rau, Federal Common Law and Arbitral Power, 8 NEV. L.J.
169, 200 (2007).
22. See Bermann, supra note 10, at 2.
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efficaciously, as challenges to the process frequently arise at the
outset of a dispute.23 Unfortunately, the procedural tools provided
in FAA §§ 3 and 4 to assist the courts in fulfilling their role are
simply that—procedural.24 Neither section denotes the
appropriate circumstances in which a stay of litigation, or an
order compelling arbitration, should be granted.25 Thus, devoid of
statutory directives, courts have struggled to maintain juridical
clarity in confronting complex issues which arise at the outset of
disputes—in the grey area between litigation and arbitration.26
One such issue has caused a significant split among the
Circuit Courts of Appeals. Particularly, courts have struggled to
discern whether a party resisting arbitration must show
prejudice in order to prove that its opponent waived its right to
arbitrate by engaging in pretrial conduct.27 A majority of circuits

23. See id. (describing how one way in which courts fulfill their policing role
is to ensure that “arbitral proceedings are initiated and pursued in a timely and
effective manner,” as “courts are commonly asked . . . to intervene at the very
outset” of a dispute).
24. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3–4 (2011) (governing stays of litigation pending
arbitration and motions to compel arbitration).
25. See Bermann, supra note 10, at 3 n.5 (noting that neither § 3 nor § 4
“addresses the issues that may specifically be raised” in order to secure an order
to stay, or compel, arbitration under those sections).
26. See id. at 4 (stating that, in addressing issues which arise at the outset
of disputes, courts have developed “disparate strands of analysis” which “have
combined to produce a needlessly confusing case law to the detriment of clarity,
coherence, and workability”); Steven H. Reisberg, The Rules Governing Who
Decides Jurisdictional Issues: First Options v. Kaplan Revisited, 20 AM. REV.
INT’L ARB. 159, 159 (2009) (discussing the “significant confusion as to how a court
is to decide which forum, the court or the arbitrator, has the jurisdiction to
decide [a] threshold issue”).
27. See The Federal Arbitration Act—Waiver, APPELLATE.NET (Feb. 22,
2011), http://www.appellate.net/docketreports/html/2010/docketreport_22Feb11.
asp#Case1 (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) [hereinafter FAA Waiver] (stating the
issue as whether “a party opposing arbitration must demonstrate that it was
prejudiced by the other party’s conduct in order to show that that party had
waived its right to compel arbitration”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Stok & Assocs., P.A. v.
Citibank, N.A., No. 10-514 (11th Cir. 2010) (framing the issue as whether “a
party [should] be required to demonstrate prejudice after the opposing party
waived its contractual right to arbitrate by participating in litigation”); see also
Born, supra note 5 (describing the issue as whether “prejudice on the part of a
resisting party is necessary for an opposing party’s right to compel arbitration to
be deemed waived”).
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do require a showing of prejudice, albeit at varying degrees.28
Conversely, the minority does not require prejudice, but holds a
presumption of waiver which may be rebutted in certain
circumstances.29
The circuit split recently prompted the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari in order to resolve the matter in Stock &
Associates, P.A. v. Citibank, N.A.30 Although the parties settled
their dispute before the Court ruled on the merits,31 its decision
would have had a momentous impact on the business community
and the arbitral process itself. Indeed, the issue is “of great
interest to any business that makes use of arbitration
agreements,” as the grounds invoked to resist arbitration often
include waiver “through preliminary litigation conduct.”32 The
Court’s decision, as described by one practicing arbitration
attorney, would have “affect[ed] how quickly (or not) parties must
determine whether arbitration clauses apply to their case and
when arbitration rights must be asserted.”33 In other words, the
28. See, e.g., Lewallen v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 487 F.3d 1085, 1090
(8th Cir. 2007) (utilizing a three-pronged test for waiver which, in part, requires
prejudice); Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that
a “modicum of prejudice” is necessary to find waiver); Sovak v. Chugai Pharm.
Co., 280 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 2002) (utilizing a three-pronged test for
waiver which, in part, requires a showing of prejudice); Ivax Corp. v. B. Braun of
Am., Inc., 286 F.3d 1309, 1315–16 (11th Cir. 2002) (requiring that one party
somehow prejudice an opposing party in order to find waiver); Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. of N.Y. v. Soft Drink & Brewery Workers Union Local 812, 242 F.3d
52, 57 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that proof of prejudice is necessary to find waiver);
MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 2001) (requiring
“actual prejudice” to find waiver); Walker v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 938 F.2d 575,
577 (5th Cir. 1991) (requiring an invocation of the judicial process by one party
which prejudices the other party).
29. See, e.g., Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d
388, 390 (7th Cir. 1995) ([W]e have deemed an election to proceed in court a
waiver of a contractual right to arbitrate, without insisting on evidence of
prejudice . . . .”); Nat’l Found. for Cancer Research v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.,
821 F.2d 772, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“This circuit has never included prejudice as
a separate . . . element of the showing necessary to demonstrate waiver of the
right to arbitration.”).
30. See Stok & Assocs., P.A. v. Citibank, N.A., 387 F. App’x 921 (11th Cir.
2011), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3254 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2011) (No. 10-514).
31. See Stok & Assocs., P.A. v. Citibank, N.A., 387 F. App’x 921 (11th Cir.
2011), cert. dismissed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3686 (U.S. June 2, 2011) (No. 10-514).
32. FAA Waiver, supra note 27.
33. American Arbitration Association, Supreme Court Agrees to Hear
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opinion would have “provide[d] an analytical framework that
parties and courts [could] apply to a broad range of arbitration
issues that arise.”34 Given the importance of this issue,
commentators predict that the Court will address the matter in
the near future.35 In the meantime, this Note attempts to fill the
doctrinal void recognized by the Supreme Court, and assuage the
juridical strife by developing its own analytical framework to
supplant the waiver doctrine.
This Note’s analysis of the waiver doctrine proceeds as
follows: Part II of this Note discusses the key contractual benefits
which attract parties to arbitration. Particularly, it discusses how
arbitration agreements, as forum-selection and proceduralmapping devices, stabilize and optimize parties’ contractual
relationships.36 Further, Part II analyzes the Supreme Court’s
FAA jurisprudence and concludes that contract law should govern
the waiver by conduct analysis.37 Part III provides an overview of
the circuit split surrounding waiver doctrine. Particular attention
is paid to the prejudice requirement and the discrepancies it
perpetuates among the circuits.38 Part IV provides the
contractual background for the proposal advanced by this Note. It
draws the distinction between waiver as defined by contract law,
and waiver as applied by the Circuit Courts of Appeals in the
arbitral context. It concludes that, in light of the Supreme Court’s
recent FAA jurisprudence, a party cannot “waive” its right to
arbitrate.39 Therefore, it posits that an entirely new framework is
required.

“Waiver of Arbitration” Case, 66 DISP. RESOL. J. 4, 21 (2011).
34. Id.
35. See Born, supra note 5 (“Now that the case has been dismissed, it
seems likely that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari the next time it finds
itself presented with an appropriate opportunity to address this issue.”).
36. See infra Part II (discussing the contractual benefits provided by
arbitration).
37. See infra Part II (discussing how, under the severability doctrine,
waiver is a gateway issue which must be resolved in accordance with contract
law).
38. See infra Part III (describing the circuit split and discussing the
divergence engendered by the prejudice requirement).
39. See infra Part IV (concluding that a party cannot, in accordance with
contract law, waive its right to arbitrate).
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Finally, Part V proposes a comprehensive contractual
solution through a succinct judicial framework in order to discern
whether a party has lost its right to arbitrate through pretrial
conduct. Part V first proposes that the discharge-of-duty
doctrine40 is the appropriate contract-law defense for a party
responding to excessive pretrial conduct.41 Next, Part V proposes
that courts should read an implied term into all arbitration
agreements. This term would require that parties demand
arbitration within a reasonable time after one party files a claim
in court.42 In order to discern what constitutes a reasonable time,
this Note proposes the adoption of a reasonableness test,
comprised of the four-factor framework promulgated by the New
York courts. These courts consider “the nature and object of the
contract, the previous conduct of the parties, the presence or
absence of good faith, . . . and the possibility of prejudice or
hardship” to either party.43 Part V concludes with a hypothetical
illustrating the efficacy of the reasonableness test both
doctrinally and from a policy perspective.
II. Arbitration: Objectives and Law
A. The Contractual Benefits of Arbitration: Forum and
Procedural Freedom
Before discussing the current legal doctrine surrounding
arbitration in the United States, it is crucial to consider what
attracts parties to arbitration. What core benefits do parties
derive through bargained-for arbitral procedures? In what

40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225(2) (1981) (“Unless it
has been excused, the non-occurrence of a condition discharges the duty when
the condition can no longer occur.”).
41. See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (stating
that arbitration agreements may only be invalidated by “generally applicable
contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability”).
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (1981) (“When the parties
to a bargain . . . have not agreed with respect to a term which is essential to a
determination of their rights and duties, a term which is reasonable in the
circumstances is supplied by the court.” (emphasis added)).
43. Zev v. Merman, 533 N.E.2d 669, 669 (N.Y. 1988).
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circumstances does arbitration present a more appealing
adjudicatory forum than litigation?
As a starting point, arbitration agreements are “in effect, a
specialized kind of forum-selection clause.”44 Parties who bargain
for arbitration essentially contract for the choice between two
legal regimes—litigation and arbitration.45 Comparatively,
parties might choose one forum over the other for any number of
reasons. For example, arbitration may be more expedient, cost
effective, and pose fewer risks of “aberrational” jury awards.46 In
other circumstances, parties might desire the full panoply of
procedural protections and appellate review processes offered by
the judicial system.47 Particularly, high stakes disputes or issues
concerning clearly delineated legal principles may prompt
recourse to a judicial, rather than an arbitral forum.48 In any
event, arbitration provides a judicially accepted49 alternative
“structure,” or “basic set of parameters within which people are
free to” resolve their disputes.50
Additionally, parties acting within this alternative structure
have the ability to establish procedures by which their disputes
will be resolved.51 To be sure, parties could opt to include a
44. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974); see Christopher
R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 MARQ. L. REV.
1103, 1105 (2011) (stating that arbitration clauses are essentially “contractual
forum selection devices”).
45. See Keith N. Hylton, Arbitration: Governance Benefits and Enforcement
Costs, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 489, 490 (2005) (stating that “parties who can
choose to submit their disputes to arbitration . . . have a choice between two
legal regimes,” litigation and arbitration).
46. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses
Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 451
(2010) (stating that “arbitration may be faster and cheaper than
litigation, . . . may lessen the risk of punitive damages awards or aberrational
jury verdicts[,] . . . [and] may decrease exposure to class actions”).
47. See id. at 453 (discussing the circumstances in which parties might
choose to resolve their disputes through litigation rather than arbitration).
48. See id. at 436 (stating that parties may prefer litigation to arbitration
in “high stakes disputes” and “disputes in areas with clear and well developed
law,” as the “industry expertise” of arbitrators is less valuable in such cases).
49. See Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 44, at 1105 (stating that “[c]ourts
[have] largely accepted” arbitration clauses as forum-selection devices, subject
only “to a narrow range of exceptions”).
50. See Hylton, supra note 45, at 489.
51. See Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 44, at 1105 (noting that parties to
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forum-selection clause in their contract to site potential disputes
in a court with favorable procedural rules.52 Once invoked,
however, most rules of civil procedure provide little, if any,
opportunity to restrict their application.53 Stated differently, “a
party might pick from among several restaurants but could not
control what would be on the menu.”54
By contrast, “arbitration clauses have a more profound effect
on the procedure by which disputes are resolved.”55 In some cases,
they incorporate the rules of arbitral institutions by reference,56
which act as “mini-codes of civil procedure.”57 These codes,
however, merely provide default rules which give way in the
wake of express terms in the parties’ arbitration agreement.58 In
other instances, parties construct their own arbitral framework,
negotiating procedural rules in lieu of those offered by arbitral
institutions.59 In either case, however, parties may select any
number of procedural measures, including restrictions on
discovery, remedies, and limitations periods,60 subject only to due

arbitration agreements have the ability to bargain “over procedural rights even
before a dispute arises”).
52. See id. at 1114 (describing the operative purpose of forum-selection
clauses).
53. See id. (noting that once the litigation forum is “fixed
contractually . . . most rules of civil procedure limit[] the parties’ ability to
contract around its provisions”).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 1106 (stating that arbitration agreements “may incorporate
by reference the rules of arbitral institutions”).
57. Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 597
(2005).
58. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES 20 (2009) [hereinafter AAA RULES] (“The
parties, by written agreement, may vary the procedures set forth in these
rules.”); Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 44, at 1106 (stating that the rules of
arbitral institutions “can be overridden by the express terms of the parties’
arbitration agreement”).
59. See Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 44, at 1106 (noting that
procedural rules may be “explicit terms of the parties’ contract, decoupled from
the rules of an administering institution”).
60. See id. at 1107 (stating that examples of potential arbitral procedures
include “limits on the availability of discovery, contractually imposed limitations
periods, . . . [and] limitations on remedies”).
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process concerns.61 Thus, arbitration clauses serve as both forumselection devices and “procedural contracts” in which parties
construct dispute resolution mechanisms that best support their
contractual arrangements.62
Ultimately, parties spend substantial resources establishing
arbitral procedures, in lieu of the no-cost regime provided by the
judicial system, to optimize the “processes and outcomes”
surrounding their disputes.63 Indeed, “[a]rbitration provides an
alternative forum in which parties can structure rules and
enforcement methods so that the difference between governance
benefits and enforcement costs is larger than in the default
regime represented by ordinary courts.”64 Governance benefits
encompass the costs saved by having rules which limit the level
of risk that one party can impose on the other (i.e., a rule against
breaching the contract).65 Conversely, enforcement costs include
the costs of both writing the rules and arbitrating to enforce the
rules which govern the contractual relationship in question.66
After engaging in this cost–benefit analysis,67 rational parties
will adopt procedural rules that they expect “will provide them
with a better process than litigation,” better “outcomes than
litigation, or both.”68 At its core, then, arbitration provides
61. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2011) (providing limited grounds, rooted in due
process concerns, upon which a party may seek to modify or vacate an arbitral
award); AAA RULES, supra note 58, at 32 (“[E]ach party has the right to be
heard and . . . given a fair opportunity to present its case.”).
62. Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 44, at 1106.
63. Drahozal & Ware, supra note 46, at 451.
64. Hylton, supra note 45, at 493.
65. See id. at 491 (describing governance benefits as “[a]ny set of rules
governing interaction among private parties” which will “provide a benefit for
which the parties are willing to pay,” such as rules which “govern the amount of
risk that one can impose on others”).
66. See id. (stating that enforcement costs include the costs of both writing
and enforcing “the rules governing private interaction”).
67. See id. at 492 (noting that parties “will waive a legal rule whenever the
governance benefit from the rule is less than the enforcement cost”);
Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Out of National Law: An Empirical Look
at the New Law Merchant, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 523, 531–32 (2005)
[hereinafter Drahozal, Contracting Out] (stating that, in choosing an
adjudicatory forum, parties consider whether “the process costs of arbitration”
are “higher or lower than the process costs of litigation”).
68. Drahozal & Ware, supra note 46, at 451.
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stability. It allows parties to mitigate risks and costs appurtenant
to their contractual relationships by extending predictability to
the dispute resolution process.69 Thus, adequately enforced, post
hoc arbitral procedures optimize the very contractual
arrangements which impel their existence.70 The key, however, is
Therefore,
the
current
FAA
adequate
enforcement.71
jurisprudence aims to preserve the stability derived through
bargained-for arbitral procedures by protecting parties’ legitimate
expectations.72
69. See Antony W. Dnes, Franchise Contracts, Opportunism and the
Quality of Law, 3 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 257, 259 (2009) (noting that
“private enforcement mechanisms,” such as arbitration, are “a means to
stabilize contracts within a foreseeable range of variation of market conditions”);
Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and
Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549, 550
(2003) (stating that predispute arbitration agreements are “designed to
minimize the costs of [contracting parties’] relationship[s]”); Hylton, supra note
45, at 491 (stating that “[a] rule against breaching contracts, if complied with
perfectly, provides an ex ante benefit” to the parties’ contractual relationship);
Amy J. Schmitz, Consideration of “Contracting Culture” in Enforcing Arbitration
Provisions, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 123, 153 (2007) (“Prior dealings, personal
relationships, and concern for maintaining good business reputations may
compel players within a business community to comply with their contracts, or
resolve disputes without the aid of the courts . . . . because private dispute
resolution often solves far more problems than rigid litigation . . . .”); Thomas J.
Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 831, 831–32
(stating that, through arbitration, lawyers have the opportunity to “limit or
manage problems prospectively” by negotiating and drafting “suitable issue and
conflict resolution mechanisms for contractual relationships” which “assur[e]
control and reduc[e] uncertainty and risk”).
70. See Drahozal, Contracting Out, supra note 67, at 532–33 (finding that
predispute choice of law provisions in contracts, “like the choice between
arbitration and litigation,” lend certainty to parties’ contractual relationships
which provides for adequate pricing of contract rights and duties and decreases
the costs and frequency of litigation); Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 69, at 580,
582 (finding that parties bargain for arbitral procedures when that forum
“provides the optimal level of deterrence against undesirable conduct,” thus
increasing governance benefits and “the quality of output and level of effort” in
parties’ contractual relationships); Hylton, supra note 45, at 500 (finding that
because arbitration agreements “enhance governance benefits,” they promote
“organizations working more effectively on a day-to-day basis”).
71. See Bermann, supra note 10, at 2 (noting that courts play an
“important policing role” in assuring “that arbitration delivers the various
advantages associated with it”).
72. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011)
(“Arbitration is a matter of contract, and the FAA requires courts to honor
parties’ expectations.”); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct.
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B. Arbitration Doctrine: The Supreme Court’s Interpretation
of the FAA
Because the benefits derived from arbitration are, in essence,
contractual, it is appropriate that the FAA protects arbitration
agreements as contracts.73 The Supreme Court, however, has not
always interpreted the FAA in a manner so conducive to parties’
arbitral rights. Thus, a brief historical note will better frame the
importance and implications of the Supreme Court’s current FAA
jurisprudence.
1. Early Twentieth Century Arbitration: Pre- and Post-FAA
Prior to the FAA, opportunities to bargain for arbitral
procedures were severely constricted.74 Considered nothing more
than tools of oppression,75 courts generally nullified arbitration
agreements and assumed jurisdiction over the matter in
question.76 In 1925, however, Congress moved to quell the
“judicial hostility” toward arbitration agreements by enacting the
FAA.77
The FAA’s stated purpose is to place arbitration agreements
“upon the same footing as other contracts.”78 It “declares simply
that . . . agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and
1758, 1773–74 (2010) (“Whether enforcing an agreement to arbitrate or
construing an arbitration clause, courts and arbitrators must give effect to the
contractual rights and expectations of the parties.” (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted)).
73. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2011) (mandating the protection of arbitration
agreements as contracts).
74. See Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 44, at 1112 (noting how
“opportunities to control procedure” through arbitration clauses “were largely
non-existent” prior to the FAA).
75. Parsons v. Ambos, 48 S.E. 696, 697 (Ga. 1904) (stating that arbitration
agreements are used merely as tools to “oppress the weak”).
76. See W.H. Blodgett Co. v. Bebe Co., 214 P. 38, 40 (Cal. 1923) (stating
that courts could simply “disregard [arbitration] agreements, assume
jurisdiction, and determine the matters in dispute”); see also Parsons, 48 S.E. at
697 (finding that arbitration clauses “may be revoked by either party at any
time before the award”); Cocalis v. Nazlides, 139 N.E. 95, 98 (Ill. 1923) (holding
arbitration clauses “void”).
77. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011).
78. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
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provides a procedure in the federal courts for their
enforcement.”79 Despite this seemingly clear mandate, however,
skepticism surrounding arbitrators’ motives and juridical
prowess remained.80 As such, federal courts continued to hold
certain claims nonarbitrable, including alleged violations of
federal securities81 and antitrust laws.82 As a result, claims
arising under those laws remained in court, where the ability to
bargain for optimal procedures remained limited.83 Gradually,
however, federal courts’ distrust of arbitration subsided.
Beginning with Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Co.84 in 1967, the Supreme Court became
increasingly willing to enforce arbitration agreements.85 Indeed,
the Prima Paint Court devised one of the most doctrinally
significant concepts in U.S. arbitration law to date—the
severability doctrine.86 It essentially “permits courts to entertain
challenges specifically applicable to the arbitration agreement,
and not to the contract as a whole.”87 The Court devised the
79. Id. at 1–2.
80. See Peter B. Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
549, 553 (2008) (noting that “courts showed greater tolerance” for arbitration
agreements after Congress passed the FAA, but that “there were still limits” to
that tolerance).
81. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953) (refusing to allow the
arbitration of federal securities claims because arbitral awards “may be made
without explanation,” without a “record of their proceedings,” and “arbitrators’
conception of the legal meaning” of certain statutory requirements “cannot be
examined”).
82. See Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827–
28 (2d Cir. 1968) (finding that antitrust cases should be resolved in court given
their complexity and the fact that antitrust laws regulate the business
community in which many arbitrators are a part).
83. See Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 44, at 1112–13 (discussing how,
under the “nonarbitrability doctrine,” claims which remained in federal court
were subject to limited “opportunities to influence procedure by contract”).
84. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404
(1967) (recognizing arbitration clauses as separate, binding contracts).
85. See Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL.
L. REV. 695, 702 (stating that “the Supreme Court’s decisions became more
favorable to arbitration” beginning with Prima Paint in 1967).
86. See Bermann, supra note 10, at 24 (finding the severability doctrine
“well-entrenched” in U.S. arbitration law).
87. Id. at 23; see Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403–04 (holding that if a claim is
directed at “the arbitration clause itself . . . the federal court may proceed to
adjudicate it,” but that claims directed at “the contract generally” must be
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doctrine in accordance with the FAA’s mandate to limit judicial
obstruction and facilitate expedient access to the arbitral forum.88
After Prima Paint, parties’ rights to bargain for arbitral
procedures continued to expand throughout the 1970s and 1980s
in two critical ways.89 First, the nonarbitrability doctrine
dissipated,90 as the Supreme Court held federal securities claims,
RICO claims,91 and antitrust claims arbitrable.92 Second, the
Court interpreted FAA § 2 as declaring a national federal policy
favoring arbitration, thus withdrawing states’ power to declare
certain claims nonarbitrable.93 In effect, state authority was
supplanted by the “federal substantive law of arbitrability.”94
This body of law requires that “doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues” be resolved in favor of arbitration, including
those regarding “the construction of the contract language itself
or . . . allegation[s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability.”95 The Supreme Court thus came to embrace
freedom of contract principles in the arbitral context, creating
greater potential for parties to regulate the forum and procedures
by which to resolve their disputes.96
referred to the tribunal).
88. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404 (formulating the severability doctrine
in order to “honor . . . the unmistakably clear congressional purpose that”
arbitration “be speedy and not subject to delay and obstruction by the courts”).
89. See Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 44, at 1113 (noting that
throughout the “1970s and 1980s,” the “opportunities to control procedure by
contract expanded”).
90. See id. (noting that “as the nonarbitrability doctrine crumbled,” parties
“had an incentive . . . to use their new contractual freedom” to establish
appropriate procedures).
91. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987)
(finding agreements to arbitrate both Securities Exchange Act claims and RICO
claims enforceable under the FAA).
92. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
640 (1985) (finding antitrust claims arbitrable under the FAA).
93. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (“In enacting § 2
of the [FAA], Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and
withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of
claims which . . . contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”).
94. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983).
95. Id. at 24–25.
96. See Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 44, at 1114 (noting that the
Supreme Court’s acceptance of “freedom of contract” raised a “newfound
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2. Current Arbitration Doctrine: Enforcing Arbitration
Agreements as Contracts
Judicial acceptance of arbitration agreements continues to
expand today.97 For example, in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds International Corp.,98 the Supreme Court found
that a party cannot be forced to submit to class arbitration unless
“there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed
to do so.”99 Similarly, in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan,100 the Court found that parties can empower tribunals to
determine whether they have jurisdiction over certain disputes.101
Thus, courts will defer to an arbitrator’s decision regarding its
own jurisdiction if the parties agreed to confer such power.102 If
the parties did not confer such power, then the courts will
decide.103 Indeed, one of the only contractual measures
invalidated by the Supreme Court involved an attempt to expand
the grounds on which to vacate an arbitral award under the
FAA.104 The Court’s aim, however, was to limit post-proceeding
contractual freedoms in order “to maintain arbitration’s essential
virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.”105 Thus, the Court
opportunity to control procedure by contract”).
97. See id. at 1165 (stating that “[t]he greater judicial solicitude [toward
arbitration] that took root in the early 1970s . . . fully blossomed by the late
1980s” and continues to grow).
98. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775
(2010) (finding that contracting parties must explicitly agree to allow class
arbitration).
99. Id.
100. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995)
(finding that parties may empower arbitrators to determine their own
jurisdiction over certain disputes).
101. See id.
102. See id. (finding that “court[s] should give considerable leeway to the
arbitrator” to determine its own jurisdiction if the parties agreed to confer such
power).
103. See id. (“If . . . the parties did not agree to submit the arbitrability
question itself to arbitration, then the court should decide that
question . . . independently.” (emphasis in original)).
104. Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 583 (2008) (finding
that the FAA provides the exclusive grounds for vacating and modifying arbitral
awards).
105. Id. at 588.

1626

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1609 (2012)

sought to uphold the national policy favoring arbitration by
preserving the key benefits that arbitration provides both before
and during arbitral proceedings.106
Recently, the FAA’s limits on contractual freedom were
tested yet again in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.107 In
Concepcion, the issue was whether state laws which held classarbitration waivers per se unconscionable conflicted with the
FAA.108 Answering in the affirmative, the Court stated that
although the FAA “preserves generally applicable contract
defenses,” it does not protect state laws which “stand as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of [its] objectives.”109 Thus,
although California’s Discover Bank rule sowed its roots in
unconscionability, a generally applicable contract defense, it was
nonetheless preempted for its “disproportionate” application to
arbitration agreements.110
In arriving at its conclusion, the Court declared its latest
interpretation of the FAA’s core objectives. It stated that the
“overarching purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure the enforcement
of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to
facilitate streamlined proceedings.”111 The two goals inherent
within this objective—enforcement of arbitration agreements and
facilitation of expedient dispute resolution—should neither
conflict nor rank in importance. 112 Rather, the Court alluded to

106. See id. at 583 (viewing FAA §§ 9–11 “as substantiating a national policy
favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain
arbitration’s” expediency).
107. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011)
(finding a state law that held class arbitration waivers unconscionable
preempted by the FAA, as it stood “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted)).
108. See id. at 1744 (considering “whether the FAA prohibits [s]tates from
conditioning the enforceability of certain arbitration agreements on the
availability of classwide arbitration procedures”).
109. Id. at 1748.
110. Id. at 1747, 1753.
111. Id. at 1748.
112. See id. at 1749 (describing the FAA’s two underlying goals as
“enforcement of private agreements and encouragement of efficient and speedy
dispute resolution” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
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the possibility that an optimal rule would further both objectives
in unison.113
But what role do courts play in enforcing the FAA’s
overarching objective in relation to arbitrators? How is it that
courts retain jurisdiction to decide certain disputes, but not
others? Over which disputes do courts retain jurisdiction? The
answer to these inquiries is governed by one of the most
important doctrinal concepts in U.S. arbitration law—
severability.114
3. Severability: A “Gateway” to Arbitration
The severability doctrine115 has become firmly ensconced in
substantive federal arbitration law116 and performs two key
functions.117 First, derived from FAA § 4,118 it reflects the
fundamental principle that arbitrators derive their authority
through party consent.119 In this regard, severability insulates
113. See id. (noting explicitly that “[i]n the present case . . . those ‘two goals’
do not conflict—and it is the dissent’s view that would frustrate both of them”
(emphasis in original)).
114. See Bermann, supra note 10, at 22 (stating that severability “serves a
highly salutary purpose” in arbitration law, in that it upholds “[p]arty
expectations”).
115. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (describing the severability
doctrine).
116. See Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc., v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2774 (2010)
(noting that arbitration agreements are “severable from the remainder” of the
underlying contract); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440,
445 (2006) (“[A]s a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration
provision is severable from the remainder of the contract.”); Prima Paint Corp.
v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403 (1967) (promulgating the concept
that arbitration clauses are severable from the remainder of the underlying
agreement); Bermann, supra note 10, at 24 (noting that the severability doctrine
is “well-entrenched in the case law”).
117. See Bermann, supra note 10, at 23 (finding that severability in U.S.
arbitration law performs “twin functions”).
118. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2011) (providing parties the ability to petition a
federal court to compel arbitration); Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403 (finding that
the severability doctrine has its roots in FAA § 4, which requires federal courts
to compel arbitration “once it is satisfied that the making of the agreement for
arbitration . . . is not in issue” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
119. See AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648–
49 (1986) (finding the notion that arbitration requires consent an “axiom” which
“recognizes the fact that arbitrators derive their authority to resolve disputes
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the arbitral process from challenges directed toward the
underlying contract, preserving the forum in which the parties
agreed to resolve their disputes.120 In effect, the doctrine ensures
that parties’ disputes are resolved according to their legitimate
expectations, thus maintaining arbitration’s stabilizing effect.121
Second, severability “permits courts to entertain challenges
specifically applicable to the arbitration agreement, [but] not to
the contract as a whole.”122 This function implicates the critical
“demarcation between gateway and non-gateway issues.”123
Indeed, some of the issues most salient to the “tradeoff between
[the] efficacy and legitimacy” of the arbitral process occur at the
outset of a dispute, before the tribunal is constituted.124 The
critical inquiry at this stage is whether a party is contractually
obligated to arbitrate, notwithstanding its objections to the
contrary.125 The answer requires a delicate balancing between
arbitration’s consensual foundation and the costs and delays
appurtenant to ensuring such consent.126 Gateway issues thus
only because the parties have agreed in advance to submit such grievances to
arbitration”); Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368,
374 (1974) (“The law compels a party to submit his grievance to arbitration only
if he has contracted to do so.”); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) (“For arbitration is a matter of contract
and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he
has not agreed so to submit.”).
120. See Bermann, supra note 10, at 22 (One purpose [of severability] . . . is
to enable an arbitral tribunal to declare a contract invalid or unenforceable on
the merits, without thereby necessarily destroying the basis of its authority to
make that very ruling.”).
121. See id. (“Party expectations concerning arbitration would clearly be
disserved if arbitral tribunals were deemed, by virtue of deciding that a contract
is invalid, to deprive themselves of the legal authority to make that very
decision.”).
122. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–
04 (1967) (instructing federal courts to “order arbitration to proceed once it is
satisfied that ‘the making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is not in issue’”);
Berman, supra note 10, at 23.
123. See Bermann, supra note 10, at 22.
124. Id. at 5.
125. See id. (noting that the critical question at the outset of a dispute “is
whether a party unwilling to arbitrate is obligated, on the basis of a prior
undertaking, to do so”).
126. See id. (“[A] party cannot be bound by an agreement to
arbitrate . . . unless it consented to be so bound. On the other hand, arbitration
becomes a less effective means of dispute resolution to the extent that, prior to
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encompass those “jurisdictional or threshold” issues, grounded in
consent, which courts will resolve rather than leave for the
tribunal.127 By contrast, non-gateway issues, such as substantive
claims arising from the parties’ underlying contract, are for
tribunals to decide.128 In this regard, severability acts as a
“jurisdiction-allocating device” between challenges directed
toward the underlying contract, and those directed toward the
arbitration clause itself.129 The former are non-gateway issues, as
they encompass the very contractual issues which parties agree
to arbitrate.130 The latter, however, are gateway issues because
they directly implicate “the tribunal’s authority to decide
anything—including the validity and enforceability of the main
contract.”131
Ultimately, the role of severability as a gatekeeper to the
arbitral forum is critical. It remains the guidepost for allocating
jurisdiction over certain issues between courts and arbitrators at
the outset of a dispute.132 But once a gateway issue has been
raised, how does severability impact a court’s decision to uphold,
or deny, parties’ arbitral rights?

arbitration, parties may have recourse to courts to advance reasons why
arbitration should not go forward . . . .”).
127. See id. at 7. Professor Bermann notes that although the term “gateway
issue” has been read broadly by the Supreme Court to encompass a variety of
jurisdictional issues, the Court’s most recent interpretation, and the one
adopted by both Professor Bermann and this Note, subscribe to the narrower
meaning described above. Id. at 7–8. See also Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc., v. Jackson,
130 S. Ct. 2772, 2777 (2010) (“[P]arties can agree to arbitrate ‘gateway’
questions of ‘arbitrability,’ such as whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate
or whether their agreement covers a particular controversy.”).
128. See Bermann, supra note 10, at 8 (describing non-gateway issues as
“those that courts reserve for initial determination, along with the merits, to the
tribunal itself”).
129. Id. at 24.
130. See id. at 23 (“The question whether a contract on which a claim in
arbitration is predicated exists and is valid . . . clearly forms part of the merits
of a case, and as such falls . . . within the arbitrators’ province to resolve.”).
131. Id.
132. See id. at 24 (noting that severability is “the touchstone for determining
whether courts should initially entertain challenges to the enforceability of an
arbitration agreement or refrain from doing so”).
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4. The Impact of Severability on Parties’ Arbitral Rights in
the Courts
The Supreme Court has solidified the severability doctrine’s
place in federal arbitration law in three key cases. First, in Prima
Paint, the Court applied the doctrine in light of a claim that
because the overall contract was fraudulently induced, the
arbitration clause within the contract was invalid as well.133 After
finding that claims for fraud fell within the scope of the parties’
arbitration agreement, the Court affirmed the trial court’s
decision to stay judicial proceedings pending arbitration.134 In
doing so, it found that FAA § 4 instructs courts to compel
arbitration if a challenge is not directed toward the arbitration
clause itself.135 As such, the severability doctrine was conceived.
Almost forty years after Prima Paint, the Supreme Court
revisited the severability doctrine136 in Buckeye Check Cashing,
Inc. v. Cardegna.137 In Buckeye, however, the Florida Supreme
Court refused to enforce an otherwise valid arbitration agreement
on grounds that the underlying contract was illegal, rather than
fraudulent.138 Rejecting this distinction, the Supreme Court found
that state courts must apply the severability doctrine in the same
manner as federal courts.139 Further, after Buckeye, the Court
133. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404
(1967) (finding that the claim in question alleged “fraud in the inducement of
the contract generally”).
134. See id. at 399–400, 406 (finding the language “‘(a)ny controversy or
claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement’” sufficiently broad to
encompass Prima Paint’s claim for fraud).
135. See id. at 403 (finding that a court must “order arbitration to proceed
once it is satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is not in
issue” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
136. See Steven J. Ware, Arbitration Law’s Separability Doctrine After
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 8 NEV. L.J. 107, 107 (2008) (noting
that Buckeye “is only the second Supreme Court decision applying the
separability doctrine and it comes nearly forty years after” Prima Paint).
137. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 446 (2006)
(finding claims against an entire agreement under state usury and consumer
protection laws arbitrable under FAA § 2).
138. See id. (noting that the Florida Supreme Court declined “to apply
Prima Paint’s rule of severability” on grounds that severability cannot apply to
contracts found illegal or void).
139. See id. at 449 (“[R]egardless of whether the challenge is brought in
federal or state court, a challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole, and
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made clear that challenges directed toward the underlying
contract are “irrelevant” for severability purposes.140 Thus, an
otherwise severable arbitration agreement will be upheld, even if
claims for fraud, illegality, or breach of contract permeate the
underlying agreement.141
Finally, in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,142 the
Supreme Court upheld a provision, as part of a stand-alone
arbitration agreement, which delegated all disputes arising out of
the parties’ employment contract to arbitration.143 In doing so, it
affirmed the notion established in Buckeye, finding that the
“[a]pplication of the severability rule does not depend on the
substance of the remainder of the contract.”144 Thus, even if “the
underlying contract is itself an arbitration agreement,” the
severability doctrine protects the delegation provision unless
challenged directly.145
Ultimately, the severability doctrine protects arbitration
clauses as binding, autonomous contracts within contracts.146 It
supplements FAA § 2 in ensuring that arbitration agreements are
afforded the full spectrum of contract-law protections, regardless
of any challenges directed toward the underlying contract.147 In
not specifically to the arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator.”).
140. Id. at 446.
141. See id. (stating that a valid arbitration agreement will be upheld,
regardless of whether claims for “fraud, misrepresentation, breach of contract,
breach of fiduciary duty,” or public policy are directed at the overall contract).
142. Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc., v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2781 (2010) (finding
that an unconscionability claim directed at an autonomous arbitration
agreement is arbitrable).
143. See id. at 2775 (describing the parties’ employment relationship and
arbitration agreement).
144. Id. at 2779.
145. Id.
146. See Bermann, supra note 10, at 22 (noting that the severability doctrine
“basically posits that an arbitration agreement constitutes an agreement
separate and apart from the main contract”); Ware, supra note 136, at 109
(stating that the severability doctrine treats an “arbitration clause as if it is a
separate contract from the contract containing the arbitration clause”).
147. See Jackson, 130 S. Ct. at 2777–78 (finding that an arbitration
agreement “is simply an additional, antecedent agreement” which is “valid
under [FAA] § 2 ‘save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract’” (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2011))); see also AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745–46 (2011) (stating that FAA
§ 2 reflects “the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract”
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this regard, the doctrine isolates and magnifies the discrete
benefits derived through arbitration. These benefits do not stem
from the parties’ underlying agreement, but from the arbitration
clause itself—the ex ante stability and predictability which
promote parties’ contractual arrangements.148 As such, gateway
issues involving direct challenges to an arbitration agreement
must be resolved in accordance with contract law149—no more, no
less.150 In this regard, it is next critical to discern whether waiver
is a gateway issue to which contract law must apply.
5. The Origins of the “Waiver” Doctrine in the Arbitral Context:
Correctly Applied?
In the arbitral context, waiver refers to whether a party,
through words or conduct, has somehow lost its right to
arbitrate.151 Federal courts construe the term waiver from FAA
§ 3, finding the word “default”152 in that provision analogous “to
waiver or laches or estoppel.”153 In application, the courts
distinguish “between contract-based waiver and conduct-based
and, as such, may only be invalidated by “generally applicable contract
defenses” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
148. See supra Part II (discussing the benefits that parties derive from
arbitration).
149. See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)
(“[G]enerally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without
contravening [FAA] § 2.”); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (“A
court may not, then, in assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration
agreement, construe that agreement in a manner different from that which it
otherwise construes nonarbitration agreements under state [contract] law.”).
150. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404
n.12 (1967) (“As the ‘saving clause’ in [FAA] § 2 indicates, the purpose of
Congress in 1925 was to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other
contracts, but not more so.”).
151. See supra Part I (explaining that the concept of waiver which this Note
addresses is waiver through pretrial conduct, not express waiver).
152. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2011) (stating that courts must stay litigation pending
arbitration, provided that the party applying for the stay is “not in default in
proceeding with such arbitration”).
153. In re Mercury Constr. Corp., 656 F.2d 933, 939 (4th Cir. 1981); see
Morewitz v. W. of Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Prot. and Indem. Ass’n, 62 F.2d 1356,
1365 n.16 (11th Cir. 1995) (“Although the Arbitration Act uses the term
‘default’ . . . the case law on this subject employs the term ‘waiver.’”).
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waiver, holding that the former is for the arbitral tribunal to
decide, while the latter may be determined at the threshold by a
court.”154 Contract-based waiver, for example, occurs when a
party waives its right to arbitrate a certain claim arising out of
the underlying contract.155 Conduct-based waiver, however,
occurs when a party waives its right to invoke the arbitration
agreement by, for example, litigating disputes which the parties
agreed to arbitrate.156
The Supreme Court has yet to address conduct-based waiver,
or to define “default” under FAA § 3. Indeed, the Court’s only
reference to waiver occurred in the contract-based context—in
discerning the scope of arbitrable claims.157 Critically, however,
the Court has found that FAA “§ 3 adds no substantive restriction
to § 2’s enforceability mandate.”158 Rather, § 2 creates
154. Bermann, supra note 10, at 42.
155. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 7,
29 (1983) (finding that the question as to whether a party has “lost any right to
arbitrat[e]” the “underlying contractual dispute” due to “waiver, laches,
estoppel, [or] failure to make a timely demand for arbitration” is for the
arbitrator to decide); see also Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452
(2003) (finding disputes “about what the arbitration contract in each case means
(i.e., whether it forbids the use of class arbitration procedures) is a dispute
relating to this [underlying] contract and the resulting ‘relationships’” and is for
“an arbitrator, not a judge” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted));
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) (finding that
“‘procedural questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final
disposition’ are presumptively not for the judge, but for an arbitrator, to decide”
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted)).
156. See, e.g., Grigsby & Assocs., Inc. v. M Sec. Inv., 664 F.3d 1350, 1353
(11th Cir. 2011) (“It is presumptively for the courts to adjudicate disputes about
whether a party, by earlier litigating in court, has waived the right to
arbitrate.”); JPD, Inc. v. Chronimed Holdings, Inc., 539 F.3d 388, 393 (6th Cir.
2008) (holding that “the court, not the arbitrator, presumptively evaluates
whether a defendant should be barred from seeking a referral to arbitration
because it has acted inconsistently with reliance on an arbitration agreement”);
Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 219 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding that
issues surrounding waiver by pretrial conduct are for the “court to decide
itself”); Marie v. Allied Home Mortg. Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005)
(finding that the Supreme Court “did not intend to disturb the traditional rule
that waiver by conduct, at least when due to litigation-related activity, is
presumptively an issue for the court”).
157. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24 (“The basic issue presented in
Mercury’s federal suit was the arbitrability of the [underlying] dispute between
Mercury and the Hospital.”).
158. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1902 (2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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“substantive federal law” which incorporates traditional state
contract law principles in governing “the enforceability of
arbitration agreements.”159 Therefore, neither § 3 nor § 4 alter the
“background principles of state contract law” for determining the
validity and enforceability of arbitration agreements.160
Ultimately, the current doctrine illuminates how courts
should approach the conduct-based waiver analysis. First,
conduct-based waiver implicates the “obligation to arbitrate,
rather than the contract’s substantive obligations.”161 Thus,
although courts and commentators have criticized this
approach,162 conduct-based waiver is properly considered a
gateway issue under the severability doctrine.163 Second, FAA § 2
requires that courts enforce arbitration agreements in accordance
with generally applicable contract law principles.164 Finally, as
§ 3 adds no substantive element to § 2’s enforceability mandate,
waiver, as derived from § 3, must meet the definition of waiver
prescribed by contract law.165 Before turning to contract law,
159. Id. at 1901–02.
160. Id. at 1902.
161. Bermann, supra note 10, at 42.
162. See, e.g., Clyde Bergemann, Inc. v. Sullivan, Higgins & Brion, PPE
LLC, No. 08-162-KI, 2008 WL 4279632, at *1, *1 (D. Or. Sept. 18, 2008)
(criticizing the notion, in light of prior Supreme Court jurisprudence, that
waiver of any kind is for the court to decide); Bermann, supra note 10, at 43
(“More general considerations of efficacy and legitimacy suggest that all claims
of waiver should be determined initially by the arbitrators.”). Professor
Bermann explains that the conduct-based, contract-based waiver distinction is
another issue currently arising among federal courts. Id. Namely, the issue
concerns whether conduct-based waiver is, in fact, a gateway issue. This Note
does not address this issue. Rather, it adopts Professor Bermann’s notion that,
from a purely doctrinal perspective, waiver by conduct should be considered a
gateway issue under the severability doctrine and, thus, for the courts to decide.
Id. at 42.
163. See Bermann, supra note 10, at 42 (stating that, for severability
purposes, waiver “should be treated as a gateway issue”).
164. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)
(“When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain
matter . . . courts generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law principles that
govern the formation of contracts.”); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9
(1987) (stating that a court may not “in assessing the rights of litigants to
enforce an arbitration agreement, construe that agreement in a manner
different from that in which it . . . construes nonarbitration agreements under
state law”).
165. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1902 (2009)
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however, it is first appropriate to address the circuit split
surrounding this issue. Doing so will better frame the doctrinal
conflict between arbitration and contract law engendered by the
circuits’ waiver analyses; a conflict which clearly contravenes the
FAA’s overarching objective and the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of its provisions.166
III. The Circuit Split
The Supreme Court’s gradual acceptance of arbitration
agreements as contracts167 has caused “several oddities” to
develop within the lower courts’ FAA jurisprudence.168
Particularly, a circuit split has formed regarding the following
question: Must a party resisting arbitration (nonmovant) show
prejudice in order to prove that the party demanding arbitration
(movant) waived its right to arbitrate by engaging in pretrial
conduct?169 The divergence between the circuits denies
predictability as to when, and in what forum—litigation or
arbitration—parties’ claims will be adjudicated.170 As
unpredictability begets instability, the current split denies
contracting parties the key benefits derived through bargainedfor arbitral procedures.171 A succinct overview of the circuits’

(finding that FAA “§ 3 adds no substantive restriction to § 2’s enforceability
mandate” and, as such, “traditional principles” of state contract law must
govern courts’ analyses in construing parties’ arbitral rights).
166. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011)
(“The overarching purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure the enforcement of
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined
proceedings.”).
167. See supra Part II (discussing the evolution of the Supreme Court’s FAA
jurisprudence over the last half-century).
168. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment Contract Exclusion
in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the Judiciary’s Failure of
Statutory Vision, 1991 J. DISP. RESOL. 259, 261.
169. See supra Part I (framing the issues surrounding conduct-based
waiver).
170. See supra Part I (describing the problems created by the inconsistency
among the circuits for parties attempting to bargain for optimal arbitral
procedures).
171. See supra Part II (describing the benefits derived through arbitration).
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waiver analyses aptly illustrates how ineffective and doctrinally
inaccurate the waiver doctrine truly is.
A. The Majority: Circuits Requiring Prejudice
1. Strict Enforcement: Circuits Imposing Burdensome Prejudice
Requirements
An overview of the circuits which impose burdensome
prejudice requirements illustrates that the circuit split does not
consist of a simple dichotomy—minority versus majority. Rather,
it clearly conveys that no circuits’ standards are exactly the same.
a. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit carries a strong presumption in favor of
arbitration, and waiver will not be lightly inferred.172 In order to
determine whether a party has waived its right to arbitrate, the
court considers the time elapsed in litigation, the total amount of
litigation conduct, and the degree of prejudice inflicted by the
movant through such conduct.173 To find prejudice, the court
considers the amount of discovery conducted which was not
available in arbitration, delay, expense,174 and attempts to
arbitrate motions that were previously lost on the merits in
court.175 Prejudice is the critical component to the Second
Circuit’s waiver analysis.176 Thus, courts will find waiver only if
172. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y. v. Soft Drink & Brewery Workers
Union Local 812, 242 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 2001) (describing the waiver
standard).
173. See id. (noting that its test considers “the time elapsed from the
commencement of litigation to the request for arbitration; . . . the amount of
litigation (including exchanges of pleadings, any substantive motions, and
discovery); and . . . proof of prejudice”).
174. See id. (stating that proof of prejudice includes “taking advantage of
pre-trial discovery not available in arbitration, delay, and expense”).
175. See Thyssen, Inc. v. Calypso Shipping Corp. S.A., 310 F.3d 102, 105 (2d
Cir. 2002) (“Prejudice can be substantive, such as when a party loses a motion
on the merits and then attempts, in effect, to relitigate the issue by invoking
arbitration . . . .” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
176. See id. (stating that “[t]he key to the waiver analysis is prejudice”).
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the nonmovant proves adequate prejudice.177 For example, in
Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co.,178 the court found that Oppenheimer
& Co.’s pretrial conduct did not cause sufficient prejudice to
warrant a finding of waiver.179
In Rush, Rush opened an options trading account with
Oppenheimer that required him to sign an arbitration
agreement.180 After disputes arose concerning his account,
however, Rush filed claims in federal court.181 After nearly eight
months of pretrial activity, Oppenheimer moved to compel
arbitration.182 During that time, Oppenheimer engaged in
extensive discovery, brought a motion to dismiss, and raised
numerous affirmative defenses to Rush’s complaint, all without
demanding arbitration.183
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s
finding of waiver for three key reasons.184 First, it found that
expense, delay, and motions to dismiss, standing alone, cannot
cause sufficient prejudice to warrant a finding of waiver.185
Second, it found that Oppenheimer’s demand for arbitration only
177. See Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d 885, 887 (2d Cir. 1985)
(stating that waiver will be found “only when prejudice to the other party is
demonstrated”).
178. See id. (summarizing the Second Circuit’s burdensome waiver
standard).
179. See id. at 890 (“As indicated herein we think that . . . [movant’s] right
to arbitrate has not been waived.”).
180. See id. at 886 (referencing the arbitration agreement as stating “that
any controversy between the parties would be settled by arbitration”).
181. See id. (noting that Rush “alleged improper and excessive trading in his
account”).
182. See id. at 885 (stating that “[a]fter approximately eight months of
pretrial proceedings in the district court,” Oppenheimer moved to compel
arbitration).
183. See id. at 887 (stating that Oppenheimer engaged in “rather extensive
discovery, [brought] a motion to dismiss, and pos[ed] thirteen affirmative
defenses to [Rush’s] amended complaint, all without raising the right to
arbitration”).
184. See id. (reversing the district court, stating that its findings were
insufficient to establish waiver).
185. See id. at 887–88 (noting that “delay in seeking arbitration” for eight
months “is insufficient by itself to constitute” waiver, and that motions to
dismiss are to be expected when “a plaintiff files an intricate complaint, setting
forth numerous claims . . . partially related to, the arbitrable claims” (citations
omitted)).
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after the district court allowed Rush’s claim for punitive damages
was not prejudicial.186 Indeed, the court rejected the notion that
such conduct amounted to forum shopping.187 Rather, it found
that Rush was “no worse off” than if Oppenheimer moved to
compel arbitration at the outset of the dispute, as Rush could not
claim punitive damages in arbitration at any time.188 Third, the
court invoked precedent, and declined to repudiate prior Second
Circuit decisions which refused to find prejudice in more
egregious factual circumstances.189 Ultimately, the court found
that Oppenheimer did not cause sufficient prejudice to warrant a
finding of waiver.190 In another case, however, the court found
waiver where a party delayed for eight months before demanding
arbitration; submitted numerous answers, defenses, and
counterclaims, none of which mentioned arbitration; actively
pursued discovery; waited until just before trial to compel
arbitration; and offered what the court considered a
“disingenuous” excuse for delay.191
b. The Fourth Circuit
In the Fourth Circuit, waiver will be found if a movant so
“substantially utilizes the litigation machinery” that compelling
arbitration would prejudice the nonmovant.192 The critical inquiry
186. See id. at 890 (explaining why Oppenheimer’s attempts to change
forums was not prejudicial).
187. See id. (“This is not an instance in which a party sensing an adverse
court decision [is, in effect, allowed] a second chance in another forum.” (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)).
188. See id. (finding that Rush “is no worse off proceeding now to arbitration
than had [Oppenheimer] moved for arbitration immediately after being served
with the . . . complaint” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
189. See id. (reasoning that “[s]ince [Rush] would not have been prejudiced
by a later motion to arbitrate had [Oppenheimer’s] motion to dismiss been
completely denied, [its] motion to compel arbitration following reversal . . . of
[its] initial, partial success” could not have prejudiced “Rush either” (citing
Sweater Bee By Banff, Ltd. v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 754 F.2d 457, 466 (2d Cir.
1985))).
190. See id. (finding that Oppenheimer’s “right to arbitrate has not been
waived”).
191. See Leadertex, Inc. v. Morganton Dyeing & Finishing Corp., 67 F.3d 20,
26 (2d Cir. 1995).
192. MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 2001).
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is whether the nonmovant has satisfied its “heavy burden” to
prove prejudice.193 To find prejudice, the court considers the
totality of the movant’s delay and pretrial conduct.194 For
example, in MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia,195 the court found
that Lauricia failed to prove the degree of prejudice necessary to
establish waiver.196
In MicroStrategy, MicroStrategy responded to Lauricia’s
employment discrimination charges by filing three separate
claims against her in state and federal court, despite the
arbitration clause in her employment contract.197 Six months
after its initial filing, MicroStrategy moved to compel
arbitration.198 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district
court’s finding of waiver on two key grounds.199 First, it refused to
find prejudice when most of the claims adjudicated in court were
unrelated to those subject to arbitration.200 Second, it found that
Lauricia failed to prove whether MicroStrategy used pretrial
discovery procedures to obtain information which would have
been unavailable in arbitration.201 Thus, the court concluded that
Lauricia failed to prove a sufficient degree of prejudice to
establish waiver.202 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has refused to
193. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
194. See id. (finding that “delay and the extent of the moving party’s trialoriented activity are material factors in assessing a plea of prejudice”).
195. See id. at 254 (reversing the “district court’s conclusion that
MicroStrategy waived its right to arbitration”).
196. See id. (finding that Lauricia failed to prove “that she suffered the kind
of prejudice necessary to support a finding that MicroStrategy waived its right”
to arbitrate).
197. See id. at 246 (noting that the clause required the parties “to arbitrate
[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to [the] . . . employment
relationship”).
198. See id. at 250 (“[T]he time between the filing of the first action and the
arbitration request was . . . six months.”).
199. See id. at 248 (reversing the district court’s determination that
MicroStrategy waived its right to arbitrate).
200. See id. at 251 (refusing to find prejudice where most of the litigation
was “directed to claims unrelated to those” subject to arbitration).
201. See id. at 254 (refusing to “conclude that Lauricia was prejudiced by the
minimal amount of information obtained by MicroStrategy that” was likely
obtainable in arbitration).
202. See id. (“Because Lauricia has failed to establish that she suffered the
kind of prejudice necessary to support a finding that MicroStrategy waived its
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find prejudice where a movant delayed its demand for arbitration
for eight months; filed “affirmative defenses, engaged in
discovery, and responded to motions”; moved for arbitration three
months before trial; and inflicted undue costs because of its
conduct.203
c. The Fifth Circuit
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit finds waiver “when the party
seeking arbitration substantially invokes the judicial process to
the detriment or prejudice of the other party.”204 The court holds
a presumption against finding waiver, and places a heavy burden
on nonmovants to prove that waiver is appropriate.205 Finally,
prejudice results when a movant inflicts delay, expense, or forces
the nonmovant to arbitrate issues already disputed in court.206
Applying its test, the court in Walker v. J.C. Bradford & Co.207
found that Plaintiffs failed to show a sufficient degree of prejudice
to warrant a finding of waiver.208
In Walker, Plaintiffs filed suit in state court, alleging various
state securities law violations, despite the arbitration agreement
in their contract with Bradford.209 Thirteen months after
Plaintiffs’ initial filing, Bradford removed the case to federal
right to insist on arbitration, the district court erred by denying MicroStrategy’s
motion to compel arbitration.”).
203. Patten Grading & Paving, Inc. v. Skanska USA Bldg., Inc., 380 F.3d
200, 205–08 (4th Cir. 2004).
204. Walker v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 938 F.2d 575, 577 (5th Cir. 1991)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
205. See id. (holding “a presumption against finding waiver” and placing “a
heavy burden of proof” on nonmovants attempting to establish waiver).
206. See Republic Ins. Co. v. PAICO Receivables, LLC, 383 F.3d 341, 346
(5th Cir. 2004) (finding prejudice when a movant inflicts “delay, expense, or
damage to a [nonmovant’s] legal position,” which occurs when the nonmovant is
forced to arbitrate an issue which was previously litigated (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted)).
207. See Walker, 938 F.2d at 578 (finding that Bradford’s “actions in federal
court were not so substantial as to mandate that we overcome the legal
presumption” against waiver).
208. See id. (finding that Plaintiffs did not present “enough evidence” that
Bradford’s conduct “materially prejudiced them”).
209. See id. at 576 (describing the pretrial process in which the parties
engaged before Bradford moved to compel arbitration).
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court and subsequently moved to compel arbitration.210 On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding of
waiver on three grounds.211 First, the court cast Plaintiffs’ claims
of cost and delay as “generalized protestations,” insufficient to
“overcome the strong federal presumption in favor of
arbitration.”212 Second, the court found Bradford’s pretrial
conduct—its
removal
to
federal
court,
preliminary
interrogatories, document requests, and answer—insufficient, in
light of prior precedent, to establish prejudice.213 Finally, the
court refused to find discovery prejudicial without proof that
Bradford obtained information which was unavailable in
arbitration.214 Ultimately, the court found that Plaintiffs failed to
satisfy their heavy burden to prove prejudice and, thus, establish
waiver.215 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has refused to find
prejudice where a movant delayed for eight months before
demanding arbitration; filed an answer, interrogatories, and
document production requests; moved for protective orders; and
agreed to a joint motion to extend the discovery period.216

210. See id. (“Thirteen months after plaintiffs filed suit, defendant filed a
motion to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings.”).
211. See id. at 577 (reversing the district court’s finding of waiver).
212. Id. at 578.
213. See id. at 576–77 (discussing Bradford’s pretrial conduct and citing
prior decisions in which the court refused to find prejudice where parties
“invoked the judicial process to approximately the same extent as Bradford”
(citing Tenneco Resins, Inc. v. Davy Int’l, A.G., 770 F.2d 416, 420–21 (5th Cir.
1985))).
214. See id. at 578 n.3 (stating that that if Bradford’s discovery conduct
“revealed items that would not be discoverable in arbitration proceedings,” it
would “be more likely to find that plaintiffs were prejudiced”); see also
MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244, 251 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that if
“the same information could have been obtained in an arbitration proceeding,”
then the nonmovant suffers no prejudice).
215. See Walker v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 938 F.2d 575, 578 (5th Cir. 1991)
(finding Plaintiffs’ evidence “insufficient to overcome the strong federal
presumption in favor of arbitration” (citations omitted)).
216. See Tenneco Resins, Inc. v. Davy Int’l, A.G., 770 F.2d 416, 420 (5th Cir.
1985) (describing the movant’s pretrial conduct).
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d. The Sixth Circuit

The Sixth Circuit addresses arbitral issues “in light of the
strong federal policy” favoring arbitration.217 The court holds a
presumption in favor of arbitration under its two-pronged test,
and waiver will not be lightly inferred.218 Indeed, the court will
find waiver only where a movant takes actions that are
inconsistent with any reliance on the arbitration agreement, and
where it delays demanding arbitration to an extent which
prejudices the nonmovant.219 Prejudice may be found when a
movant inflicts undue delay and expense.220 For example, in
Hurley v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas,221 the court found
waiver where Defendants’ conduct satisfied both elements of its
test.222
In Hurley, the Hurleys filed federal statutory and state law
claims in federal court against Defendants, despite the
arbitration clause in their mortgage documents.223 After two
years of pretrial activity, Defendants moved to compel
arbitration.224 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district
217. Hurley v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., 610 F.3d 334, 338 (6th Cir.
2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
218. See id. (“Because of the presumption in favor of arbitration under the
Federal Arbitration Act, we will not lightly infer a party’s waiver . . . .” (citations
omitted)).
219. See id. (finding waiver where a party takes “actions that are completely
inconsistent with any reliance on an arbitration agreement,” and “delay[s] its
assertion to such an extent that the opposing party incurs actual prejudice”)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
220. Gen. Star Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 289 F.3d
434, 438 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that prejudice will be found when a party
incurs “unnecessary delay or expense” (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)).
221. See Hurley, 610 F.3d at 338 (concluding that Defendants’ conduct
satisfied “both factors indicating waiver”).
222. See id. at 340 (finding Defendant’s actions “completely inconsistent
with any reliance on an arbitration agreement,” and that Defendants “delayed
asserting their right to arbitrate to such an extent that they . . . actually
prejudiced” the Hurleys).
223. See id. at 336 (quoting the arbitration clause in the mortgage
documents as requiring “[a]ll disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or
related to the loan . . . be resolved by binding arbitration, and not by court
action”).
224. See id. at 338 (noting that Defendants failed to demand arbitration for
over two years from the time the Hurleys “initiated this lawsuit”).
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court’s finding of waiver under its two-pronged test.225 First, it
found Defendants’ persistent and active pretrial activity over the
course of two years inconsistent with any reliance on the parties’
arbitration agreement.226 Second, the court found that because
the Hurleys conducted substantial discovery, argued numerous
summary judgment motions, and changed venue at Defendants’
request, they suffered prejudice as a result of Defendants’
delay.227 Thus, in light of such conduct, the court found that
Defendants waived their right to arbitrate.228 Similarly, the Sixth
Circuit has found waiver where a movant delayed demanding
arbitration for one year, during which time it engaged in
extensive discovery and filed numerous pretrial motions.229
e. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit also applies its test in light of the liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.230 Furthermore,
nonmovants bear a heavy burden of proof in establishing each
element of its three-pronged test.231 Particularly, a nonmovant
must show that the movant knew of its right to compel
arbitration; that the movant acted inconsistently with that right;
225. See id. at 340 (finding Defendants’ actions both completely inconsistent
with any reliance on the arbitration agreement and prejudicial).
226. See id. at 338–39 (finding that Defendants’ numerous “dispositive and
nondispositive motions,” including “motions to dismiss, motions for summary
judgment, and a motion to change venue,” indicated little, if any, reliance).
227. See id. at 340 (finding prejudice where Defendants’ delay caused the
Hurleys to incur “the costs of active litigation in two federal courts,” employ
“four attorneys, undergo[] extensive discovery, argue[] four summary judgment
motions,” and change “venue at Defendants’ request”).
228. See id. (concluding that “Defendants have waived their right to
arbitrate” and affirming the district court’s order “denying Defendants’ motion
to compel arbitration”).
229. See Manasher v. NECC Telecom, 310 F. App’x 804, 805–06 (6th Cir.
2009) (finding that the movant waived its right to arbitrate where it delayed
demanding arbitration for one year, “engaged in discovery[,] and participated
in . . .motions to certify [a] class and to amend the complaint”).
230. See Sovak v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 280 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 2002)
(stating that “waiver must be resolved in light of the FAA’s preference for
arbitration” (citations omitted)).
231. See id. (finding that nonmovants bear a “heavy burden of proof in
showing” that its test is met (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
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and that it suffered prejudice because of the movant’s delayed
demand for arbitration.232 For example, in Fisher v. A.G. Becker
Paribas, Inc.,233 the court refused to find waiver when the Fishers
failed to prove each element of its test.234
In Fisher, the Fishers filed claims in federal court alleging
violations of various federal securities and state common laws.235
Three-and-one-half years after the Fishers filed their claims,
Becker moved to compel arbitration.236 During that time, both
parties “filed pretrial motions and engaged in extensive
discovery.”237 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court’s finding of waiver on two key grounds.238 First, it found
that Becker did not act inconsistently with its right to arbitrate
because, under the intertwining doctrine, the Fishers’ arbitrable
claims could not be separated from their nonarbitrable securities
claims, making the entire dispute nonarbitrable.239 The Supreme
Court has since rejected both the intertwining doctrine and the
notion that federal securities claims are not arbitrable.240 Second,
232. See id. (finding waiver where the nonmovant shows that “(1) [the
movant] had knowledge of its existing right to compel arbitration; (2) [the
movant] acted inconsistently with that existing right; and (3) [the nonmovant]
suffered prejudice from [the movant’s] delay in moving to compel arbitration”).
233. See Fisher v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., 791 F.2d 691, 694–98 (9th Cir.
1986) (describing extensive pretrial conduct by a movant that did not amount to
a waiver of the right to arbitrate).
234. See id. at 698 (“The Fishers have failed to support their contention that
Becker acted inconsistently with an existing right to compel arbitration . . . [or]
to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the alleged inconsistent acts.”).
235. See id. at 693 (noting that the Fishers alleged violations of “federal
securities laws as well as . . . [state] common law claims”).
236. See id. (finding that Becker delayed demanding arbitration for three
and one-half years).
237. Id.
238. See id. at 698 (reversing the district court’s finding of waiver and
ordering that “any arbitrable claims be submitted to arbitration immediately”).
239. See id. at 694–95 (noting that the intertwining doctrine “holds that
when it is impractical if not impossible to separate out nonarbitrable from
arbitrable claims, a court should deny arbitration in order to preserve its
exclusive jurisdiction over federal securities claims” (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted)).
240. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 220–21
(1987) (“Exchange Act claims are arbitrable under the provisions of the
Arbitration Act.”); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985)
(“[T]he Arbitration Act requires district courts to compel arbitration of pendent
arbitrable claims . . . even where the result would be possibly inefficient
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the court found that Becker’s failure to raise arbitration as an
affirmative defense, the possibility that there may be some
duplication of efforts in litigation and arbitration, and the
Fishers’ own failure to demand arbitration by filing claims in
court, were factors in concluding that the Fishers failed to
establish prejudice and, thus, waiver.241
Although Fisher may simply be a product of its time,242 the
Ninth Circuit continues to require a strong showing of prejudice.
For example, it has found prejudice only where a movant’s
actions caused “staleness of [a] claim” and subjected the
nonmovant to litigation in state court, including discovery, the
costs of litigation, and a judgment on the merits.243 The court also
refused to find prejudice when a nonmovant incurred significant
costs in the pretrial stages of litigation, but expressed more of a
willingness to find prejudice had the case proceeded through
discovery and a trial.244
f. The Eleventh Circuit
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit applies its two-pronged test in
light of the strong federal policy favoring arbitration.245 It foists a
heavy burden upon parties attempting to satisfy its test and
invoke waiver.246 To meet its test, a nonmovant must prove that
maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums.”).
241. See Fisher v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., 791 F.2d 691, 697–98 (9th Cir.
1986) (discussing the grounds on which the court refused to find prejudice).
242. See supra note 240 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme
Court’s refutation of the intertwining doctrine and the notion that federal
securities claims are not arbitrable).
243. Hoffman Constr. Co. of Or. v. Active Erectors and Installers, Inc., 969
F.2d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 1992).
244. See United Computer Sys., Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 298 F.3d 756, 765 (9th
Cir. 2002) (stating that if the “defendants permitted the case to proceed to
discovery and to a trial, an argument of prejudice . . . would be much more
compelling”); but see Lewallen v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 487 F.3d 1085,
1093 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding that a motion to dismiss can cause sufficient
prejudice to warrant a finding of waiver).
245. See Citibank, N.A. v. Stok & Assocs., P.A., 387 F. App’x 921, 923 (11th
Cir. 2010) (stating that “federal law favors arbitration” (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted)).
246. See id. (“[A]ny party arguing waiver of arbitration bears a heavy
burden of proof.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
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the movant acted inconsistently with its right to arbitrate, and
that it was prejudiced by the movant’s acts.247 A movant acts
inconsistently with its right to arbitrate when its conduct,
including pretrial activity, indicates an intent to avoid
arbitration.248 To find prejudice, the court considers the length of
delay, expense, and damage to the nonmovant’s legal position
incurred through discovery.249 For example, in Stone v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., Inc.,250 the court found Hutton’s delay and pretrial
conduct sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a finding of waiver.251
In Stone, Plaintiff filed claims in federal court despite its
arbitration agreement with Hutton.252 It alleged various federal
and Florida securities law violations, as well as common law
claims.253 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
court’s finding of waiver under its two-pronged test.254 First, the
court found that Hutton’s one-year-and-eight-month delay
rendered its motion “untimely.”255 Second, the court found
247. See Ivax Corp. v. B. Braun of Am., Inc., 286 F.3d 1309, 1315–16 (11th
Cir. 2002) (articulating its test as a means to determine whether, “under the
totality of the circumstances, a party has acted inconsistently with the
arbitration right and, second . . . whether, by doing so, that party has in some
way prejudiced the other party” (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)).
248. See Stok, 387 F. App’x at 924 (stating that a party acts inconsistently
with the right to arbitrate when its conduct, “including [substantial]
participation in litigation . . . manifests an intent to avoid or waive arbitration”
(citations omitted)).
249. See id. (evaluating “the prejudice prong by considering the length of
delay in demanding arbitration,” expenses incurred, and the extent to which
pretrial discovery damaged the nonmovant’s legal position (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted)).
250. See Stone v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 898 F.2d 1542, 1544 (11th Cir.
1990) (describing how the movant’s conduct caused a sufficient degree of
prejudice to warrant a finding of waiver).
251. See id. (finding both the “extent of discovery conducted” and the extent
of Hutton’s delay sufficient to warrant a finding of waiver).
252. See id. at 1543 (noting that the arbitration agreement required “any
controversy arising out of” Plaintiff’s account to be “settled by arbitration”).
253. See id. at 1542 (noting that plaintiff’s complaint alleged a violation of
“section 10(b)” of the “Securities Exchange Act of 1934,” Florida securities law
violations, and “common law fraud, negligence, and breach of fiduciary
obligations”).
254. See id. (affirming the “district court’s order denying [Hutton’s] motion
to compel arbitration”).
255. Id. at 1544.
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Hutton’s conduct prejudicial because it engaged in discovery
typically conducted by parties preparing for trial.256 Particularly,
Hutton deposed Plaintiff twice and responded to document
production requests, while Plaintiff submitted four sets of
interrogatories, three document production requests, and
scheduled numerous depositions.257 As such, the court concluded
that Hutton waived its right to arbitrate.258 Similarly, the
Eleventh Circuit has found waiver where a movant delayed for
eight months before demanding arbitration.259 During that time,
the movant deposed five of the nonmovant’s “employees (totaling
approximately 430 pages),” and the nonmovant filed both a
motion to dismiss and a motion to oppose discovery.260
g. A Brief Summary: The Strict Enforcement Divergence
A comparative analysis of the circuits which impose
burdensome prejudice requirements illustrates three significant
problems. First, and most importantly, their onerous standards
conflict with the FAA’s overarching objective.261 Each approach
sacrifices procedural expedience and efficiency in the name of
strict contractual enforcement.262 The Supreme Court, however,
256. See id. (finding Hutton’s conduct prejudicial because it engaged in
“discovery typical of a party preparing for trial”).
257. See id. at 1543 (describing the parties’ pretrial conduct).
258. See id. at 1544 (concluding that Hutton “waived its right to compel
arbitration”).
259. See S&H Contractors, Inc. v. A.J. Taft Coal Co., 906 F.2d 1507, 1514
(11th Cir. 1990) (“In this case, S&H waited eight months from the time it filed
its complaint to the time it demanded arbitration.”).
260. Id.
261. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011)
(“The overarching purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure the enforcement of
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined
proceedings.”).
262. See, e.g., Walker v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 938 F.2d 575, 578 (5th Cir.
1991) (refusing to find waiver in light of the strong federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements, but conceding that movant’s conduct wasted both the
court’s and the parties’ time); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d 885, 891 (2d
Cir. 1985) (“Although granting defendants’ demand for arbitration . . . may be
sanctioning a less efficient means of resolving this dispute, we reemphasize that
neither efficiency nor judicial economy is the primary goal behind the
arbitration act.”).
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has expressed a desire to avoid such conflict where possible.263
Second, the divergence between each circuit’s analysis detracts
from the predictive power and stability that parties expect
through bargained-for arbitral procedures.264 Compounding this
problem is that courts within the same circuit often arrive at
discrepant outcomes in similar factual circumstances.265
Finally, a number of circuits which propagate burdensome
prejudice requirements have regarded their holdings with
disdain. For example, in MicroStrategy, the Fourth Circuit
recognized that MicroStrategy took an aggressive “course of
litigation for the sole purpose of wearing [Lauricia] out, both
emotionally and financially.”266 Similarly, in Walker, the Fifth
Circuit “sympathized with [P]laintiffs’ exasperation,” conceding
that Bradford’s attempts “to switch judicial horses in midstream”
wasted both the courts’ and the parties’ time.267 Further, the
Second Circuit stated that it would refuse to find waiver without
a strong showing of prejudice, no matter how “unjustifiable” a
movant’s
conduct.268
Ultimately,
burdensome
prejudice
requirements both flout parties’ legitimate expectations of
stability and contravene the FAA’s overarching objective.269 A
more concrete, contractual approach is needed to unify the
circuits’ analyses within the scope of the FAA.
263. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749 (discussing how the FAA’s two
underlying goals need not, and should not, conflict).
264. See supra Part II (describing the benefits that parties expect through
arbitration).
265. For example, district courts within the Sixth Circuit have applied its
waiver standard in an inconsistent manner. Compare U.S. Enrichment Corp. v.
Sw. Elec. Co., Inc., No. 5:07CV-36-R, 2008 WL 199881, at *1, *5 (W.D. Ky. Jan.
23, 2008) (refusing to find waiver after two years of negotiations, pretrial
activity, and costs because the nonmovant reserved its right to arbitrate at the
outset of negotiations and there was no “bad faith”), with Johnson Assocs. Corp.
v. HL Operating Corp., No. 3:09-CV-01206, 2010 WL 4942788, at *1, *5 (M.D.
Tenn. Nov. 30, 2010) (finding waiver where “the right to arbitrate was not
asserted for eight months, during which” time the parties engaged in pretrial
conduct).
266. MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244, 254 (4th Cir. 2001).
267. Walker v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 938 F.2d 575, 577–78 (5th Cir. 1991).
268. Leadertex, Inc. v. Morganton Dyeing & Finishing Corp., 67 F.3d 20, 26
(2d Cir. 1995).
269. See supra Part II (discussing the benefits that parties expect through
bargained-for arbitral procedures).

“WAIVING” GOODBYE TO ARBITRATION

1649

2. Circuits Imposing Lenient Prejudice Requirements
a. The First Circuit
The First Circuit holds that the key factors to finding waiver
are undue delay and a “modicum of prejudice to the other side.”270
Although some showing is required, its prejudice standard is
“tame at best.”271 To avoid waiver, the First Circuit requires that
parties demand arbitration at the earliest opportunity in order to
ensure that courts’ and parties’ “resources are not needlessly
deployed.”272 For example, in Rankin v. Allstate Insurance Co.,273
the court found Allstate’s conduct sufficiently prejudicial to
warrant a finding of waiver.274
In Rankin, the Rankins filed suit against Allstate in federal
district court, alleging breach of contract.275 Nine months after
the Rankins filed their claim, Allstate moved to compel
arbitration.276 On appeal, the First Circuit first found Allstate’s
nine-month delay unacceptable, as it knew of the coming dispute
with the Rankins as early as one month before they filed their
claim in court.277 Second, the court found prejudice “inherent in
wasted trial preparation” when a party demands arbitration after
months of delay and a short time before trial.278 Therefore, the
270. Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2003).
271. Id. at 14 (citations omitted).
272. Id. at 13 (citations omitted).
273. See id. at 14 (finding that Allstate waived its right to arbitrate by
inflicting prejudice through undue delay).
274. See id.
275. See id. at 11 (noting that the dispute between the Rankins and Allstate
concerned “[w]hether Allstate unreasonably delayed payment of what was due
[under the Rankins’ insurance contract], whether it still owe[d] money, and
whether it lost its right to invoke the arbitration provision”).
276. See id. at 10. (noting that although litigation began on March 2, 2001,
Allstate did not demand arbitration until nine months later on December 19,
2001, less than two months before the trial date set for February 11, 2002).
277. See id. at 12–13 (noting that “by February 2001 the parties were in
disagreement” about numerous issues, approximately two months before
Allstate filed “its April 2001 answer to the complaint filed in March 2001” by the
Rankins).
278. See id. at 14 (finding prejudice where “an arbitration demand is
made . . . after many months of delay and only six weeks before . . . trial”).
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court concluded that Allstate’s delay, standing alone, was
sufficient to fulfill the modicum of prejudice necessary to
establish waiver.279 Similarly, the First Circuit has found
expenses incurred as a result of dilatory behavior sufficient to
warrant a finding of prejudice, even when no useful information
was acquired through discovery.280
b. The Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit, by contrast, employs a three-pronged test
which mirrors the Ninth Circuit’s. Particularly, a party may
waive its right to arbitrate if it: “(1) knew of an existing right to
arbitrat[e]; (2) acted inconsistently with that right; and
(3) prejudiced the other party by these inconsistent acts.”281 A
party acts inconsistently with its right to arbitrate if it attempts
to litigate arbitrable claims, conducts substantial discovery, or
delays its demand for arbitration.282 The prejudice threshold is
not “onerous,”283 and may be met when a movant inflicts
unnecessary delay, expense, or when compelling arbitration
would require a “duplication of efforts” in multiple forums to
resolve the dispute.284 For example, in Lewallen v. Green Tree

279. See id. (finding that Allstate waived “its right to arbitration”).
280. See Menorah Ins. Co. v. INX Reinsurance Corp., 72 F.3d 218, 222 (1st
Cir. 1995) (finding prejudice when the nonmovant incurred unnecessary costs
through pretrial discovery, even when no “information useful to the resolution of
the dispute was . . . procured”).
281. Lewallen v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 487 F.3d 1085, 1090 (8th Cir.
2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Sovak v. Chugai
Pharm. Co., 280 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Sovak must show (1) Cook
had knowledge of its existing right to compel arbitration; (2) Cook acted
inconsistently with that existing right; and (3) he suffered prejudice from Cook’s
delay in moving to compel arbitration.”).
282. See Lewallen, 487 F.3d at 1090 (finding that a party acts inconsistently
with its right to arbitrate by “fil[ing] a lawsuit on arbitrable claims, engag[ing]
in extensive discovery, or fail[ing] to move to compel arbitration and stay
litigation in a timely manner”).
283. Hooper v. Advance Am., Cash Advance Ctrs. of Mo., Inc., 589 F.3d 917,
923 (8th Cir. 2009).
284. Lewallen, 487 F.3d at 1093 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
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Servicing, LLC,285 the court found Green Tree’s delay and pretrial
conduct sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a finding of waiver.286
In Lewallen, Lewallen filed for bankruptcy due to arrearages
on a home loan that was purchased, and serviced, by Green
Tree.287 In response to Green Tree’s proof of claim, Lewallen filed
two rounds of discovery requests and counterclaimed for various
violations of state and federal lending laws.288 Sixteen months
later, Green Tree moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the
arbitration clause in the parties’ loan agreement.289 Applying its
test, the Eighth Circuit affirmed both the bankruptcy court’s and
the district courts’ findings of waiver.290
First, the Eighth Circuit found that Green Tree’s pretrial
conduct—its lengthy delay, interrogatories, document production
requests, and motion to dismiss—was inconsistent with its right
to arbitrate.291 The court found Green Tree’s motion to dismiss
particularly egregious, noting that it pressed the bankruptcy
court to resolve Lewallen’s claims on the merits, while preserving
arbitration as an alternative forum in case of an adverse

285. See id. (finding Green Tree’s conduct both inconsistent with its right to
compel arbitration and prejudicial).
286. See id. at 1094 (concluding “that Green Tree waived its right to
arbitrate Lewallen’s claims,” and denying Green Tree’s motion to compel
arbitration).
287. See id. at 1088–89 (noting that Green Tree purchased the right to
service Lewallen’s home loan, which was in default at the time of transfer, in
2002 and attempted to foreclose on her home in 2004).
288. See id. at 1089 (stating that Lewallen objected to Green Tree’s proof of
claim and “alleged that Green Tree’s conduct violated the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act, . . . the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act . . . and
the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act”).
289. See id. at 1091 (quoting the arbitration agreement which “provided that
[Green Tree] retains an option to use judicial or non-judicial relief to enforce a
security agreement relating to the collateral secured in a transaction underlying
this arbitration agreement, to enforce the monetary obligation or to foreclose on
the collateral”).
290. See id. at 1090, 1094 (discussing and affirming both the bankruptcy
and the district courts’ findings that Green Tree waived its right to arbitrate).
291. See id. at 1092–93 (finding that Green Tree’s merits-based motion to
dismiss, discovery requests, “lengthy interrogatories,”
requests for the
“production of documents after adversary proceeding[s] commenced,” and
motions to extend the “time to respond to Lewallen’s discovery requests” were
inconsistent with its right to arbitrate).
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ruling.292 Turning to prejudice, the court found Green Tree’s
motion to dismiss and inexplicable delay prejudicial in light of
Lewallen’s precarious financial situation.293 As such, the court
concluded that Green Tree’s conduct was sufficiently prejudicial
to warrant a finding of waiver.294 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit
has found waiver when a movant delayed for four and one-half
months before demanding arbitration; filed a motion to dismiss
which required the nonmovants to litigate a number of
substantive claims; and the movant would have sought to reargue
any adverse rulings in arbitration.295
c. Lenient Prejudice Requirements: A Brief Comparison
It is first important to note the obvious doctrinal divergence
between the First and Eighth Circuits’ lenient prejudice
requirements, and the burdensome requirements imposed by
other circuits within the majority. The discrepancy between the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ prejudice standards is particularly
illustrative, given their virtually identical three-pronged waiver
tests.296
The First and Eighth Circuits’ prejudice standards diverge as
well. The Eighth Circuit, conscious of the current circuit split
regarding the prejudice requirement,297 has abandoned prejudice
292. See id. at 1092 (finding that Green Tree’s motion to dismiss essentially
“urg[ed] the bankruptcy court to dispose of Lewallen’s claims on the merits,
reserving arbitration as an alternative avenue to resolve the dispute”).
293. See id. at 1093 (finding the totality of Green Tree’s conduct prejudicial,
particularly because any wasted “time and expense” would prejudice Lewallen
at a time “when she [could] ill afford to waste resources”—in bankruptcy).
294. See id. at 1094 (concluding that “Green Tree waived its right to
arbitrate Lewallen’s claims”).
295. Hooper v. Advance Am., Cash Advance Ctrs. of Mo., Inc., 589 F.3d 917,
922–23 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding waiver when the movant “waited over four-anda-half months before filing its motion for arbitration”; when the movant’s
“motion to dismiss forced Plantiffs to brief fully a number of substantive issues”;
and when the movant “would presumably . . . reargue in arbitration issues it
lost” in its motion to dismiss).
296. See supra note 281 and accompanying text (describing the virtually
identical waiver tests shared by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits).
297. See Erdman Co. v. Phoenix Land & Acquisition, LLC, 650 F.3d 1115,
1118–19 (8th Cir. 2011) (“There is a circuit split over whether the party
asserting waiver must show prejudice . . . . [on which] [t]he Supreme Court in
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altogether in certain circumstances.298 By contrast, the First
Circuit requires some showing of prejudice in all circumstances to
find waiver, although a small degree is sufficient.299
To be sure, both circuits’ lenient requirements have
prevented manipulation300 and delay301 much more effectively
than the strict-enforcement regimes.302 The chaotic state of the
current waiver doctrine, however, deprives contracting parties of
any jurisprudential predictability. Rather, a uniform, contractual
approach would stabilize the current doctrine and realign the
circuits’ analyses within the scope of the FAA.
3. The Third and Tenth Circuits: Multifactor Tests
Both the Third and Tenth Circuits require some showing of
prejudice to find waiver. A separate analysis, however, provides
an illustrative microcosm of the overall inconsistencies caused by
the waiver doctrine. Despite both circuits’ facially similar
multifactor waiver regimes, each differs significantly in
application.

the Term just ended granted a petition for a writ of certiorari . . . .” (citations
omitted)).
298. See id. at 1120 (finding the prejudice requirement unnecessary “[i]n the
realm of construction industry disputes”).
299. See Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2003) (“[T]he
components of waiver of an arbitration clause are undue delay and a modicum of
prejudice to the other side.”).
300. See, e.g., Menorah Ins. Co. v. INX Reinsurance Corp., 72 F.3d 218, 222–
23 (1st Cir. 1995) (refusing to allow the use of arbitration agreements for
purposes of “manipulation and mischief”).
301. See, e.g., Erdman, 650 F.3d at 1120 (finding that “it makes little sense
to litigate endlessly over the details of prejudice” in certain circumstances);
Rankin, 336 F.3d at 13 (stating that its particular concern when evaluating
prejudice is “when a timely demand for arbitration must be made” in order to
facilitate “efficient planning by the court” and adequate protection of “the
opponent”).
302. See supra notes 266–68 and accompanying text (discussing the Second,
Fourth, and Fifth Circuits’ awareness of the delay and manipulation facilitated
by their burdensome prejudice requirements).

1654

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1609 (2012)
a. The Third Circuit

The Third Circuit’s “nonexclusive list of factors relevant to
the prejudice inquiry” includes the timeliness of the motion to
compel arbitration; the extent to which the movant has contested
the merits of the nonmovant’s claims; whether the movant has
informed the nonmovant of its intent to seek arbitration; the
number of “nonmerits” motions submitted by the movant; the
movant’s assent to the court’s pretrial orders; and the extent to
which both parties conducted discovery.303 The court applies its
test contextually, and not all of the factors need be present to
establish a finding of prejudice.304 For example, in Nino v.
Jewelry Exchange, Inc.,305 the court found waiver where only four
of the six factors weighed in favor of finding prejudice.306
In Nino, Nino brought an employment discrimination suit in
federal court against DI, his former employer.307 After fifteen
months, DI moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the
arbitration clause in Nino’s employment contract.308 Applying its
test, the Third Circuit reversed the district court’s refusal to find
waiver.309 Particularly, it found DI’s delay; the “substantial
amounts of time, effort, and money” Nino spent prosecuting the
action; DI’s participation in numerous pretrial conferences; and
the significant amount of discovery conducted by the parties
sufficient to cause four of the six factors to weigh in favor of
prejudice.310 As such, the court found DI’s conduct sufficiently
303. See Nino v. Jewelry Exch., Inc., 609 F.3d 191, 208–09 (3d Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
304. See id. at 209 (characterizing its factors as comprising “a nonexclusive
list” which need not all be present to justify a finding of waiver, and which must
be applied “based on the circumstances and the context of the particular case”
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
305. See id. at 209–13 (applying and discussing each of its six factors).
306. See id. at 213–14 (finding waiver where four of the six factors heavily
indicated prejudice).
307. See id. at 196 (noting that Nino alleged “he was discriminated against
on account of his gender and national origin”).
308. See id. (“After litigating the matter before the District Court for fifteen
months, the employer invoked an arbitration provision . . . and moved . . . to
compel the parties to arbitrate their dispute.”).
309. See id. (reversing “the District Court’s order compelling the parties to
arbitrate”).
310. See id. at 213–14 (analyzing DI’s pretrial conduct and concluding that

“WAIVING” GOODBYE TO ARBITRATION

1655

prejudicial to warrant a finding of waiver.311 Similarly, the Third
Circuit has found waiver where a movant’s ten-month delay and
extensive depositions, discovery requests, and document
production requests caused four of the six factors to weigh in
favor of finding prejudice.312
b. The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit’s waiver test encompasses six factors
which largely mirror the Third Circuit’s, including whether the
movant: acted inconsistently with its right to arbitrate;
substantially invoked the litigation machinery before notifying
the nonmovant of its intent to arbitrate; either demanded
arbitration close to trial, or delayed its demand for a long period
of time; filed a counterclaim without demanding arbitration
therein; took advantage of pretrial procedures which are
unavailable in arbitration; and whether its delay “affected,
misled, or prejudiced ” the nonmovant.313 The court applies these
factors to supplement three considerations regarding the
movant’s conduct. First, the court considers the extent to which
the nonmovant was prejudiced by the movant’s conduct.314
Prejudice may be shown if the movant inflicted expense, delay, or
injury to the nonmovant’s legal position.315 Second, the court
“four . . . factors—the untimeliness of DI’s motion, the extent of nonmerits
motion practice, DI’s assent to the magistrate judge’s pretrial orders, and the
extent of the parties’ discovery—weigh firmly in favor of a finding of waiver”).
311. See id. at 214 (refusing to compel arbitration where DI’s
“demand . . . came long after the suit commenced and when both parties had
engaged in extensive discovery” (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)).
312. See Gray Holdco, Inc. v. Cassady, 654 F.3d 444, 454, 458–61 (3d Cir.
2011) (considering the movant’s “litigation conduct as a whole” and finding that
its “motion for a preliminary injunction,” ten-month delay, engagement in “three
pre-trial conferences,” court-ordered mediation, and numerous “discovery
reports” was sufficient to warrant a finding of waiver).
313. See Hill v. Ricoh Ams. Corp., 603 F.3d 766, 772–73 (10th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
314. See id. at 775.
315. See id. (stating that the relevant considerations for finding prejudice
include the “delay and costs” incurred by the nonmovant, and the degree of
prejudice to the nonmovant’s legal position which “may be inferred from the
extent of discovery conducted in the case” (internal quotation marks and
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considers whether the movant is attempting to manipulate the
judicial process.316 Finally, the court considers whether the
movant is attempting to hinder the “combined efficiency of the
public and private dispute-resolution systems.”317 For example, in
Hill v. Ricoh Americas Corp.,318 the court refused to find waiver
because Ricoh’s pretrial conduct implicated none of these three
concerns.319
In Hill, Hill sued Ricoh Americas Corp. in federal court,
alleging that he was wrongfully terminated.320 After four months,
Ricoh moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration
clause in Hill’s employment contract.321 Applying its factors, the
Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding of waiver on
three key grounds.322 First, it found that Ricoh’s delay alone was
insufficient to establish waiver.323 Second, the court found that
because the trial was five months away and minimal litigation
activity occurred, granting Ricoh’s motion would neither cause
inefficiency nor facilitate manipulation.324 Finally, the court
found that Hill failed to prove prejudice in light of Ricoh’s minor
delay and pretrial conduct.325 As a result, the court refused to find
citations omitted)).
316. See id. at 773 (“An important consideration in assessing waiver is
whether the party now seeking arbitration is improperly manipulating the
judicial process.”).
317. Id. at 774.
318. See id. at 775–76 (applying its six-factor waiver test).
319. See id. at 776 (refusing to find waiver because Ricoh’s “minimal
litigation activity” did not cause prejudice, inefficiency, or “improper
manipulation of the judicial process”).
320. See id. at 769 (noting that Hill filed a claim alleging that he was
“terminated from his position at Ricoh in violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act”).
321. See id. at 769 n.2 (noting that the arbitration clause required “the
parties [to] voluntarily agree to settle the dispute by binding arbitration”).
322. See id. at 776 (“[T]he circumstances of this case, particularly in light of
the federal policy favoring arbitration, convince us that the district court should
not have found waiver . . . .”).
323. See id. at 775 (“[L]ength of time in itself does not establish waiver.”).
324. See id. (noting that the only important pretrial activities shown on the
record were “the magistrate judge’s setting the schedule for litigation,” which
was not to begin for eleven months, and the only discovery conducted was “Hill’s
request for production of documents”).
325. See id. at 775–76 (finding that Hill “failed to show any substantial
prejudice” in light of Ricoh’s minimal pretrial conduct).

“WAIVING” GOODBYE TO ARBITRATION

1657

waiver.326 In another case, however, the Tenth Circuit found a
movant’s one year delay; participation in hearings, motions,
pleadings, and depositions; and failure to demand arbitration
immediately after the claim was filed sufficiently prejudicial to
warrant a finding of waiver.327
c. The Third and Tenth Circuits Compared
The Third and Tenth Circuits’ waiver analyses encompass
analogous sets of factors which supplement divergent
considerations. The Third Circuit’s test amounts to a multifactor
“prejudice inquiry.”328 Its unitary focus on prejudice could
potentially aid parties in predicting what degree of pretrial
conduct might trigger a waiver of arbitral rights. The test’s
nonexclusive, contextual nature, however, undercuts any such
potential.329 Thus, although the court recognizes that “arbitration
is meant to streamline the proceedings, lower costs, and conserve
private and judicial resources,” it has refused to adopt any
consistent, doctrinally accurate method to accomplish these
objectives. 330
326. See id. at 776 (reversing the district court’s finding of waiver).
327. See Reid Burton Constr., Inc. v. Carpenters Dist. Council of S. Colo.,
614 F.2d 698, 703 (10th Cir. 1980) (finding the one-year delay at trial; the
movant’s “participation in numerous hearings, pretrial conferences, motions and
other pleadings, and the deposing of witnesses”; and the movant’s failure to
insist upon arbitration immediately sufficient to warrant a finding of waiver).
328. Nino v. Jewelry Exch., Inc., 609 F.3d 191, 208 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
329. See id. at 209 (noting that its list of factors is nonexclusive, “not all the
factors need be present to justify a finding of waiver, and [t]he waiver
determination . . . [is] based on the circumstances and context of [a] particular
case” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also Gray Holdco,
Inc. v. Cassady, 654 F.3d 444, 452 (3d Cir. 2011) (affirming the district court’s
judgment, but disagreeing with its finding as to how many factors indicated
prejudice); Quilloin v. Tenet Healthsystem Phila., Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 707,
721–22 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (refusing to find waiver when three factors weighed in
favor of finding prejudice and three weighed against finding prejudice, but when
those in favor were not implicated as strongly); Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l,
Inc., No. 10-2069, 2011 WL 4729009, at *1, *7 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2011) (refusing to
find waiver when two factors weighed in favor, one only “slightly” in favor, and
three against finding prejudice).
330. Nino, 609 F.3d at 209.
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By contrast, the Tenth Circuit’s test encompasses three
disparate considerations.331 Furthermore, it openly eschews any
“mechanical” balancing or exhaustive application of its factors.332
As a result, the Tenth Circuit’s scattershot approach only
compounds the divergent outcomes engendered by the Third
Circuit’s regime.333 A uniform, contractual approach, however,
would instill consistency among the circuits, stability for
contracting parties, and doctrinal accuracy in accordance with the
FAA.334
B. The Minority: Circuits Not Requiring Prejudice
The Seventh and D.C. Circuits comprise a small minority
which eschews prejudice as a necessary element of waiver.335 Its
dissent from the majority, however, has been influential.
331. See supra notes 314–17 and accompanying text (describing the various
considerations inherent in the Tenth Circuit’s waiver test).
332. See Hill v. Ricoh Ams. Corp., 603 F.3d 766, 773 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Of
course, our listing these factors . . . was not intended to suggest a mechanical
process in which each factor is assessed and the side with the greater number of
factors prevails. Nor were we even suggesting that the list . . . is exclusive.”).
333. Compare Lamkin v. Morinda Props. Weight Parcel, LLC, 440 F. App’x
604, 609 (10th Cir. 2011) (finding that all six factors weighed against finding
prejudice, but failing to consider whether the movant’s conduct caused
manipulation of the judicial process or inefficient maintenance of disputes), with
GVL Pipe & Demolition, Inc. v. Adams Cole & Dalton Rail Serv., LLC, No. CIV10-846-M, 2010 WL 4806900, at *1, *3 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 18, 2010) (refusing to
find waiver when one factor indicated that waiver was appropriate, but
conflicting with Hill by first engaging in a mechanical balancing of factors
before considering how those factors indicated prejudice, manipulation, and
efficiency). There is not a significant amount of case law which addresses waiver
by conduct subsequent to Hill. However, the opinions cited above, coupled with
the inconsistencies caused by Third Circuit’s unitary approach, strongly indicate
that the Tenth Circuit’s multifaceted regime will not yield consistent results.
334. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011)
(“The overarching purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure the enforcement of
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined
proceedings.”).
335. See, e.g., Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP v. Auffenberg, 646 F.3d 919, 923
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that a party “presumptively forfeit[s]” its right to
arbitrate if it fails to invoke that right at the “earliest opportunity on the
record”); Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390
(7th Cir. 1995) (finding that merely electing to file a claim in court “is a
presumptive waiver of the right to arbitrate”).
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Particularly, Judge Posner’s opinion in Cabinetree of Wisconsin,
Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc.336 is often cited by the majority
circuits as either the counterpoint to a burdensome prejudice
requirement337 or by those justifying a lenient prejudice
standard.338
1. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit interprets the liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements as “merely a policy of treating
such clauses no less hospitably” than other contracts.339 A party
need not show prejudice to establish waiver.340 Rather, simply
electing to litigate operates as a “presumptive waiver” of the right
to arbitrate, which may be rebutted only in “extraordinary
circumstances.”341 For example, in Cabinetree, the court found
that a movant waived its right to arbitrate by proceeding
judicially rather than demanding arbitration at the outset of the
dispute.342
In Cabinetree, Cabinetree filed suit against Kraftmaid in
state court, alleging breach of contract.343 Shortly thereafter,
Kraftmaid removed the case to federal court and, six months

336. See Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 391 (finding that a party waived its right to
arbitrate by electing to “proceed in a judicial forum,” rather than demanding
arbitration at the outset of the dispute).
337. See, e.g., Joseph Chris Pers. Servs., Inc. v. Rossi, 249 F. App’x 988, 993
(5th Cir. 2007) (citing Cabinetree as propounding a view of prejudice contrary to
its own); Leadertex, Inc. v. Morgantown Dyeing & Finishing Corp., 67 F.3d 20,
26 (2d Cir. 1995) (disagreeing with Cabinetree and refusing to find waiver
without first finding prejudice).
338. See, e.g., Hooper v. Advance Am., Cash Advance Ctrs. of Mo., Inc., 589
F.3d 917, 923 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Cabinetree to support its lenient prejudice
requirement); Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing
Cabinetree for the notion that arbitration should “be invoked at the earliest
opportunity”).
339. Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 390.
340. See id. (finding that “a party need not show that it would be prejudiced
if [a] stay were granted and arbitration ensued” in order to establish waiver).
341. Id. at 390–91.
342. See id. at 391 (affirming the district court’s finding of waiver).
343. See id. at 389 (noting that Cabinetree brought a “breach of contract
suit . . . in Wisconsin state court against Kraftmaid” ).
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later, moved to compel arbitration.344 On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of waiver, reasoning
that Kraftmaid failed to rebut the presumption that it waived its
right to arbitrate.345 The court found Kraftmaid’s explanation for
its removal and subsequent pretrial activity—that it needed
“time to weigh its options,”—the “worst possible reason for
delay.”346 Rather, it found that parties must select a forum in
which to resolve their disputes at the earliest opportunity.347
Therefore, merely electing to proceed judicially is considered
“powerful evidence” that the parties agreed to forego
arbitration.348 In a subsequent case, the Seventh Circuit found
that the movant did not trigger the presumption of waiver when
it removed the dispute to federal court six weeks after the
complaint was filed; demanded arbitration thirty days after
removal; and refrained from engaging in pretrial conduct before
demanding arbitration.349
2. The D.C. Circuit
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit recently adopted a bright-line
approach to determine whether a party has lost its right to
arbitrate through pretrial conduct.350 In Zuckerman Spaeder,
LLP v. Auffenberg,351 the court found that a movant who fails to
344. See id. (noting that six months after removal, Kraftmaid “moved the
district court under 9 U.S.C. § 3 to stay further proceedings pending arbitration
of the parties’ dispute”).
345. See id. at 391 (“The presumption that an election to proceed judicially
constitutes a waiver of the right to arbitrate has not been rebutted.”).
346. Id.
347. See id. (“Selection of a forum in which to resolve a legal dispute should
be made at the earliest possible opportunity . . . .”).
348. Id.
349. See Halim v. Great Gatsby’s Auction Gallery, Inc., 516 F.3d 557, 562
(7th Cir. 2008) (discussing the movant’s conduct and affirming the district
court’s refusal to find waiver).
350. Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP v. Auffenberg, 646 F.3d 919, 922 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (stating that, in considering whether a movant has lost its right to
arbitrate through pretrial conduct, the court has “established a few bright-line
rules”).
351. See id. at 922–23 (adopting a new standard for determining whether a
party has lost its right to arbitrate through pretrial conduct).
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invoke arbitration “on the record at the first available
opportunity . . . presumptively forfeit[s]” its right to arbitrate.352
Thus, the court replaced the waiver doctrine with forfeiture,
reasoning that intent is irrelevant for determining whether a
party has lost its right to arbitrate through pretrial conduct.353
Rather, simply failing to demand arbitration in a timely manner
will trigger forfeiture.354 To be timely, the movant’s demand must
come in its “first responsive pleading or motion to dismiss.”355 If
the movant fails this requirement, it may still access the arbitral
forum if it proves that its delay did not prejudice the opponent or
the court.356 Only a minimal amount of undue expense or delay
need be shown to establish prejudice.357 Applying this standard,
the Auffenberg court found that Auffenberg forfeited his right to
arbitrate.358
In Auffenberg, Zuckerman filed claims against Auffenberg in
the D.C. Superior Court for unpaid attorneys’ fees.359 Auffenberg
subsequently removed the case to federal court, answered
Zuckerman’s complaint, and filed counterclaims.360 After several
months of engaging in pretrial motions and court-ordered
mediation, Auffenberg moved to compel arbitration.361 The D.C.
352. Id. at 922.
353. See id. (abandoning waiver, which “refers to a party’s intentional
relinquishment . . . of a known right,” and adopting forfeiture, which simply
refers to a “failure to make a timely assertion of a right” (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted)).
354. See id. (finding that “forfeiture, not waiver, is the appropriate
standard”).
355. Id.
356. See id. at 923 (“A defendant who delays seeking a stay pending
arbitration until after his first available opportunity might still prevail on a
later stay motion provided his delay did not prejudice his opponent or the
court.”).
357. See id. (allowing access to arbitration only if a movant’s delay inflicts
“no or little cost upon opposing counsel and the courts”).
358. See id. (affirming the district court and finding that Auffenberg
forfeited its right to arbitrate).
359. See id. at 920 (noting that “Zuckerman sued Auffenberg in the District
of Columbia Superior Court to recover the [attorneys’] fees plus interest”).
360. See id. (“Auffenberg removed the case to federal court, answered the
complaint, and counterclaimed for legal malpractice.”).
361. See id. at 921 (noting that “a client may invoke mandatory arbitration
of any fee dispute” with its lawyer under “D.C. Bar Rule XIII”).
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Circuit affirmed the district court’s refusal to grant Auffenberg’s
motion on two key grounds.362 First, it found Auffenberg’s failure
to demand arbitration in his original answer sufficient to invoke
the presumption of forfeiture.363 Second, the court found that
Auffenberg’s pretrial conduct “imposed substantial costs upon
both Zuckerman and the district court.”364 Particularly,
Zuckerman was forced to conduct internal investigations, engage
in discovery, and prepare depositions.365 Auffenberg’s conduct
also consumed “inherently limited” judicial resources, including
the court’s time.366 Ultimately, because the court found
Auffenberg’s conduct prejudicial, it concluded that he failed to
rebut the presumption of forfeiture.367
3. The Seventh and D.C. Circuits Compared
Notably, both the Seventh and the D.C. Circuits have broken
with the majority to facilitate doctrinal accuracy. The Seventh
Circuit refuses to require prejudice on contractual grounds,
noting that prejudice is not required to find waiver under
contract law.368 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit repudiated the waiver
doctrine in favor of forfeiture in order to “realign litigants’
incentives . . . with the FAA.”369 Finally, both circuits seek to
prevent dilatory, manipulative strategies that impose
unnecessary costs on both nonmovants and the judicial system.370
362. See id. at 923.
363. See id. (finding Auffenberg’s failure “to invoke arbitration in (or before
filing) his original answer” sufficient to trigger the presumption of forfeiture).
364. Id.
365. See id. (“Zuckerman . . . had commenced an internal investigation,
responded to and filed discovery requests, and begun preparing for
depositions . . . .”).
366. Id.
367. See id. (affirming the “district court’s denial of the stay”).
368. See Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388,
390 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that, under contract law, waiver is “normally
effective without . . . detrimental reliance,” or prejudice (citing E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.5 (2d ed. 1990))).
369. Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP v. Auffenberg, 646 F.3d 919, 924 (D.C. Cir.
2011).
370. See id. at 922 (recognizing that its failure to articulate a concrete
standard encouraged dilatory, strategic lawsuits that “imposed . . . cost[s] upon
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Yet, although their analyses have moved toward alignment with
the FAA, the efficacy of each circuit’s presumptive regime is
questionable. Particularly, the Seventh Circuit has failed to
uphold its presumption consistently since Cabinetree, allowing
movants to affect rebuttal in divergent371 and even manipulative
factual circumstances.372 This Note, however, proposes a uniform
framework which would instill consistency and prevent
unscrupulous pretrial conduct.373
IV. “Waiving” the Right to Arbitrate: A Contractual Approach
A. The Need for a Uniform Standard
The divergent, ill-defined waiver standards propagated by
the Circuit Courts of Appeals present three significant problems.
First, their juridical inconsistencies deny contracting parties the
both litigants and the district court[s]”); Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 391 (introducing
a presumption of waiver in order to “economize on the resources, both public and
private, consumed in dispute resolution” by stifling dilatory “heads I win, tails
you lose” strategies).
371. Compare Sharif v. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., 376 F.3d 720, 722–23
(7th Cir. 2004) (refusing to find waiver when the movant delayed for nine
months before moving to compel arbitration, and filed motions to dismiss on the
merits and for improper venue, which were “briefed fully” in the district court),
and Benjamin-Coleman v. Praxair, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 750, 752, 754 (N.D. Ill.
2002) (refusing to find waiver where the movant delayed for four months, during
which time it filed three merits-based motions to dismiss), with Grumhaus v.
Comerica Sec., Inc., 223 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding waiver after a
movant delayed demanding arbitration for one year after its complaint was filed
and, subsequently, dismissed), and Pa. Chiropractic Ass’n v. Blue Cross Blue
Shield Ass’n, No. 09 C 5619, 2011 WL 210805, at *1, *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 20, 2011)
(finding waiver where the movants delayed for eight months and filed three
motions to dismiss).
372. See N. Cent. Constr., Inc. v. Siouxland Energy & Livestock Coop., 232
F. Supp. 2d 959, 968 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (refusing to find waiver, yet
acknowledging that the movant may have engaged in a “limited form of forum
shopping” by delaying its demand for arbitration); Benjamin-Coleman, 216 F.
Supp. 2d at 753 (refusing to find waiver although the movant engaged in a
“limited form of forum shopping, which the waiver doctrine is designed to
prevent”).
373. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011)
(“The overarching purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure the enforcement of
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined
proceedings.”).

1664

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1609 (2012)

predictability that they expect through bargained-for arbitral
procedures, thus destabilizing the arbitral process.374 For
example, parties subjected to onerous prejudice requirements375
often spend months consuming judicial and personal resources
pretrial, only to be forced to arbitrate according to procedures
that have lost their initial value.376 The minority’s presumptive
regime proves similarly unavailing, as it merely shifts the
unpredictability post hoc towards rebuttal.377
Second, the waiver doctrine contravenes the FAA’s
overarching objective: to “ensure the enforcement of arbitration
agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate
streamlined proceedings.”378 Indeed, the two goals inherent
within this objective—contractual enforcement and facilitation of
streamlined proceedings—should coincide.379 As to the former,
the FAA reflects the fundamental notion that arbitration
agreements, as contracts, should be enforced in accordance with
parties’ legitimate expectations.380 The circuits, however, often
subordinate these expectations in the name of the oft-cited
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.381 Unfortunately,
this reasoning misconstrues the policy’s true objective—to ensure
the “enforcement of private contractual arrangements” according
374. See supra Part III (discussing the inconsistencies among the circuits
regarding proper waiver standard).
375. See supra Part III (describing a number of circuits which impose
burdensome prejudice requirements in their waiver analyses).
376. See Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP v. Auffenberg, 646 F.3d 919, 922 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (describing the costs imposed on both litigants and the courts in the
absence of a clear standard); Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir.
2003) (noting the importance of choosing between arbitration and litigation
early in the dispute resolution process to avoid the needless deployment of both
individual and judicial resources).
377. See supra note 371 and accompanying text (describing the doctrinal
inconsistencies permeating the Seventh Circuit since Cabinetree).
378. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011).
379. See id. at 1749 (alluding to the notion that, where possible, the FAA’s
underlying goals should not conflict).
380. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing the FAA’s
contractual goal of enforcing arbitration agreements in accordance with parties’
legitimate expectations).
381. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24 (1983); supra Part III (discussing numerous cases in which courts justify
their respective waiver analyses by citing the liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements).
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to their terms.382 Indeed, it merely reflects FAA § 2’s substantive
mandate,383 which “requires courts to honor parties’
expectations.”384 Thus, the ill-defined waiver and rebuttal
standards imposed by the circuits clearly fail this requirement
because both undercut the key benefits that parties expect to
derive through bargained-for arbitral procedures—predictability
and stability.385
Further, requiring parties to prove either prejudice or
rebuttal inhibits procedural efficiency—the FAA’s second
underlying goal. Indeed, the Supreme Court has eschewed
burdensome procedural obstacles that impede a clear path to the
arbitral forum. For example, the Court has refused to require
parties to obtain an order compelling arbitration in federal court
after securing a stay of judicial proceedings in state court.386
Similarly, the Court has invalidated state laws requiring
administrative
exhaustion
before
granting
access
to
arbitration.387 To be sure, strong prejudice requirements ensure
that parties’ arbitral rights will be enforced much deeper into the
pretrial process. Long delays, however, contravene “Congress’s
intent to move the parties . . . out of court and into arbitration as
quickly and easily as possible.”388 Indeed, requiring endless
382. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
625 (1985) (emphasis added); see Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546
U.S. 440, 443 (2006) (stating that FAA § 2 “embodies the national policy
favoring arbitration and places arbitration agreements on equal footing with all
other contracts” (emphasis added) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2011))).
383. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24 (stating that FAA § 2 is “a
congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements”).
384. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011).
385. See supra Part II (discussing the benefits derived through arbitration).
386. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 27 (noting that a movant who first
obtained a stay in state court “would have no sure way to proceed with its
claims [in arbitration] except to return to federal court to obtain a § 4 order—a
pointless and wasteful burden on the supposedly summary and speedy
procedures prescribed by the Arbitration Act”).
387. See Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 347 (2008) (finding that statemandated administrative exhaustion conflicts with the FAA’s mandate to
facilitate expedient access to the arbitral forum); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28–29 (1991) (“[T]he mere involvement of an
administrative agency in the enforcement of a statute is not sufficient to
preclude arbitration.”).
388. Preston, 552 U.S. at 327 (internal quotation marks and citations
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litigation over the details of prejudice,389 or rebuttal,390 flouts the
judiciary’s responsibility to facilitate expedient access to the
arbitral forum.391
Finally, parties face the distinct possibility that their arbitral
rights will be turned against them to inflict undue delay and
expense.392 Indeed, arbitration agreements designed to protect
parties’ interests may turn from a shield to a sword in the hands
of recalcitrant parties whose contractual relationships have gone
awry.393 Such conduct inflicts unnecessary costs on both parties
and the judicial system.394 Furthermore, it strips the arbitral
process of any predictability, destabilizing parties’ contractually
established dispute resolution mechanisms.395 The circuits
omitted).
389. See Erdman Co. v. Phoenix Land & Acquisition, LLC, 650 F.3d 1115,
1120 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding that requiring parties “to litigate endlessly over the
details of prejudice” makes little sense in certain circumstances).
390. See North Cent. Constr., Inc. v. Siouxland Energy & Livestock Coop.,
232 F. Supp. 2d 959, 969 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (recognizing that its finding of waiver
would be sanctioning a less efficient means of resolving disputes, but that
“neither efficiency nor judicial economy is the primary goal behind the” FAA
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Benjamin-Coleman v.
Praxair, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 750, 754 (N.D. Ill 2002) (same).
391. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
29 (1983) (stating that, through the FAA, Congress required “summary and
speedy disposition of motions [and] petitions to enforce arbitration clauses”).
392. See, e.g., Leadertex, Inc. v. Morganton Dyeing & Finishing Corp., 67
F.3d 20, 26 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that no matter how “unjustifiable” a movant’s
conduct, it would not find waiver without first finding prejudice); Menorah Ins.
Co., Ltd. v. INX Reinsurance Corp., 72 F.3d 218, 222–23 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting
the tendency of parties to use arbitration clauses to manipulate the dispute
resolution process); Walker v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 938 F.2d 575, 577 (5th Cir.
1991) (recognizing the movant’s delay and attempts to forum shop, but refusing
to find waiver).
393. See, e.g., Cabinetree of Wis., Inc., v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d
388, 391 (7th Cir. 1995) (refusing to find waiver where a party sought to “play
heads I win, tails you lose” by seeing “how the case was going in federal district
court before deciding whether it would be better off there or in arbitration”).
394. See id. (“Selection of a forum in which to resolve a legal dispute should
be made at the earliest possible opportunity in order to economize on the
resources, both public and private, consumed in dispute resolution.”); see also
Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2003) (requiring that
arbitration be “invoked at the earliest opportunity” so that courts’ and parties’
“resources are not needlessly deployed”).
395. See supra Part II (describing the benefits parties seek through
arbitration).
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reluctantly condone such conduct, citing the liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration as if their hands are tied.396 This Note
proposes, however, that they are not so bound. A contractual
approach would prevent unscrupulous strategies employed by
obstinate parties in accordance with the FAA’s text and
overarching objective.397 Before discussing this approach,
however, it is important to note the fundamental doctrinal
inaccuracies of applying the waiver doctrine, as prescribed by
contract law, in the context of parties’ arbitral rights.
B. “Waiver” as a Generally Applicable Contract Law Defense
Recall that waiver by conduct implicates the obligation to
arbitrate.398 Therefore, it is a gateway issue that must be resolved
by the courts in accordance with contract law.399 In this regard,
the waiver doctrine’s legitimacy should be tested against the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Applying the Restatement
would comply with the FAA,400 as it sets the general conceptual
396. See, e.g., MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244, 254 (4th Cir.
2001) (refusing to find waiver under the liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration, but recognizing that the movant’s “aggressive” course of litigation
was seemingly taken to wear the nonmovant out “both emotionally and
financially”); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d 885, 889–91 (2d Cir. 1985)
(citing the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements in refusing to
find waiver where a movant demanded arbitration only after it lost a meritsbased motion to dismiss in court); North Cent. Constr., Inc. v. Siouxland Energy
& Livestock Coop., 232 F. Supp. 2d 959, 968 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (citing the liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements and refusing to find waiver, even
after acknowledging that the movant’s conduct constituted “a limited form of
forum shopping”); Benjamin-Coleman v. Praxair, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 750, 753
(N.D. Ill. 2002) (refusing to find waiver due to the liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements, even after acknowledging that the movant engaged in
forum shopping as exhibited by its pretrial activity).
397. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011)
(“The overarching purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure the enforcement of
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined
proceedings.”).
398. See supra Part II (discussing the connection between conduct-based
waiver, severability, and contract law).
399. See supra Part II (discussing how gateway issues must be decided by
the courts in accordance with contract law).
400. See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)
(stating that, under FAA § 2, arbitration agreements may by validated only by
“generally applicable contract defenses”).
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foundation upon which states have constructed their contract
law.401
Under the Restatement, waiver occurs when a party
promises to perform a conditional duty under an antecedent
contract, despite the condition’s nonoccurrence.402 A condition is
“an event, not certain to occur, which must occur . . . before
performance [of one’s duty] under a contract becomes due.”403
Thus, a party that waives a condition precedent to its duty to
perform a contractual obligation must still perform that duty,
even if the condition has not occurred.
A critical corollary to the waiver doctrine, however, is that a
condition’s occurrence must not be “a material part of the agreed
exchange for the performance of the duty.”404 Thus, the waiver
doctrine presumes that a condition is being waived, not a
contract, and that the condition was not a material part of the
underlying agreement. For example, if Promisor contracts to sell
her car to Promisee in exchange for $500, Promisor need not
tender the car until Promisee tenders the money.405 Promisor
cannot waive the purchase price, however, because she cannot
waive a condition that materially affects the value to be received
under the contract—payment in exchange for her car.406

401. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Ingredients in the Redaction of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1981) (noting that the
drafters of the Restatement felt “obliged in [their] deliberations to give weight to
all of the considerations that the courts, under a proper view of the judicial
function, deem it right to weigh in theirs” (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)); Herbert Wechsler, The Course of Restatements, 55 A.B.A. J.
147, 147 (1969) (stating that restatements generally have “enormous influence
on the development of our law”).
402. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 84(1) (1981) (“[A] promise
to perform all or part of a conditional duty under an antecedent contract in spite
of the non-occurrence of the condition is binding, whether the promise is made
before or after the time for the condition to occur . . . .”).
403. Id. § 224.
404. Id. § 84(1)(a).
405. See id. § 84 cmt. c (noting that in a contractual arrangement to “sell a
horse for $500,” a “waiver of the price of a horse is not within this Section” and,
thus, is not waiver).
406. See id. (“[W]here a promise to disregard the nonoccurrence of the
condition materially affects the value received by the promisor . . . the promise
[to waive the condition] is not binding . . . .”).
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Drawing from the Restatement, it is clear that the circuits’
analyses fundamentally conflict with contract law and, as such,
the FAA. First, under the severability doctrine, an arbitration
clause is neither immaterial, nor a condition precedent to
performance of the underlying contract. Rather, when pretrial
conduct implicates the obligation to arbitrate,407 the severability
doctrine separates the arbitration clause from the underlying
agreement.408 This severance results in a wholly autonomous
arbitration clause, fully enforceable in accordance with generally
applicable contract law principles.409 It therefore becomes clear,
under the Restatement, that a party can neither waive an
independent arbitration agreement nor the sole material benefit
derived from that agreement—access to the arbitral forum.410
Furthermore, neither prejudice nor rebuttal is necessary to
establish waiver under contract law.411
Ultimately, waiver cannot be the proper standard for
determining whether a party has lost its right to arbitrate
through pretrial conduct. The Supreme Court has interpreted
FAA § 3, from which the waiver doctrine was derived, as purely
procedural.412 It does not alter “background principles of state
contract law” in enforcing obligations to arbitrate under § 2.413
Thus, as both the majority and the minority’s standards alter the
waiver doctrine as prescribed by contract law, they clearly
contravene the FAA. In this regard, the D.C. Circuit’s forfeiture
standard proves equally unavailing. The Restatement limits
forfeiture to circumstances in which the “occurrence of the
407. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing how issues
concerning waiver, as a gateway issue, must be considered under the auspices of
contract law).
408. See supra Part II (discussing the severability doctrine).
409. See supra Part II (describing how FAA § 2 requires the enforcement of
arbitration agreements as contracts).
410. See supra notes 404–06 and accompanying text (discussing how, under
contract law, a party cannot waive a contract or the material value for which it
bargained).
411. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 84 cmt. b (1981) (stating
when “waiver is reinforced by [detrimental] reliance, enforcement is often said
to rest on estoppel,” not waiver).
412. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (discussing the origins of the
waiver doctrine).
413. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1902 (2009).
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condition [is] not a material part of the agreed exchange.”414
Therefore, forfeiture falls prey to the same conceptual barriers as
waiver. Indeed, an entirely new contractual framework must be
devised in order to realign the circuits’ analyses with one
another, and with the FAA.
V. The Proposal
A. A Contractual Approach
This Note proposes a comprehensive contractual solution
through a succinct judicial framework to discern whether a party
has lost its right to arbitrate through pretrial conduct. The
reasonableness test comprises the core of this solution and
requires courts to discern what constitutes a reasonable time to
demand arbitration.415 First, this Note identifies the key
contractual components which drive the operative function of
arbitration agreements and, through those components, sets the
proper standard. Next, this Note proposes a multifactor
reasonableness test to determine whether a party demanded
arbitration within a reasonable time after engaging in pretrial
conduct. Finally, this Note employs a useful hypothetical, based
on the Fourth Circuit’s decision in MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia,
to illustrate the efficacy of this approach.416
1. The Groundwork: A Duty to Arbitrate Subject to Conditions
The reasonableness test begins with the premise that an
arbitration clause is an autonomous contract, the performance of
which hinges upon the occurrence of “constructive (or ‘implied in
law’)” conditions.417 The FAA does not impose an affirmative duty
414. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 cmt. c (1981) (emphasis
added).
415. See Zev v. Merman, 533 N.E.2d 669, 669 (N.Y. 1988) (noting that courts
must determine “[w]hat constitutes a reasonable time for performance” on a
“case-by-case basis”).
416. See supra Part II (discussing the Fourth Circuit’s decision in
MicroStrategy, which was decided under a burdensome prejudice requirement).
417. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 226 cmt. c (1981).
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to demand arbitration under a private agreement once a dispute
arises. Rather, given parties’ ability to stay judicial proceedings
under § 3,418 the FAA provides parties the opportunity to resolve
their disputes through different mediums before resorting to
arbitration (i.e., mediation, negotiation, or litigation).419
Therefore, each party’s respective duty to arbitrate is conditioned
upon the other’s demand. If neither party invokes its right to
arbitrate, then neither party’s duty to arbitrate becomes due.420
In contract law, this nonoccurrence eventually discharges each
party’s duty to perform its contractual obligation, i.e., to
arbitrate, “when the condition can no longer occur.”421 Thus, the
discharge principle provides a conceptually accurate contract law
defense for parties attempting to avoid arbitration after litigation
has commenced.
Providing a defense, however, does not end the inquiry. The
presence of FAA § 3 and the pervasiveness of the liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration beg the question: At what point in the
pretrial process does a party’s duty to arbitrate become
discharged? Under contract law, it is first essential to consider
the language of the parties’ arbitration agreement.422 If the
parties specified time limits on their right to demand arbitration,
that should certainly end the inquiry. The Supreme Court,
however, has recently found that procedural issues, such as time
418. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2011) (providing parties to an otherwise enforceable
arbitration agreement the opportunity to stay judicial proceedings pending
arbitration).
419. See, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1901–02
(2009) (“Section 3 . . . allows litigants already in federal court to invoke
agreements made enforceable by § 2.”); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967) (noting the “unmistakably clear congressional
purpose” that arbitration be facilitated by the courts “when selected by the
parties”).
420. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225(1) (1981) (“Performance
of a duty subject to a condition cannot become due unless the condition
occurs . . . .”).
421. Id. § 225(2).
422. See, e.g., Richard D. Brown & Mara E. Fortin, An Introduction to
Interpretation of Express Contractual Indemnity Provisions in Construction
Contracts Under California and Nevada Law, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1019, 1021
(2001)
(stating
that,
under
general
“rules
governing
contract
interpretation . . . . courts will first look to the ‘plan language’” of the contract in
order “to ascertain the parties’ intent”).
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limits, are presumptively for arbitrators to decide.423 By contrast,
disputes regarding “whether the parties are bound by a given
arbitration clause” are for the courts to decide.424 The circuits
have largely interpreted this decision as leaving conduct-based
waiver within the courts’ purview.425
Consequently, however, judges will not have recourse to
concrete time limits in parties’ arbitration agreements for
determining discharge. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that
parties would bargain for procedural contingencies in case of
litigation while attempting to establish proper arbitral
procedures. Such uncertainty presents a significant quandary for
courts because one party must demand arbitration at some point
in order to trigger its opponent’s duty to arbitrate. The
Restatement, however, provides that in the absence of a “fixed
term” in the parties’ agreement setting “[t]he time within which
the condition can occur,”426 a term “which is reasonable in the
circumstances is supplied by the court.”427 Thus, to facilitate the
arbitral process, “a term calling for performance within a
reasonable time” should be “supplied.”428
2. The Reasonableness Test: What Constitutes a “Reasonable
Time” for Performance?
An inherently fact-based analysis, standards for determining
what constitutes a reasonable time for performance vary not only
from state to state, but also case by case.429 New York courts,
423. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 85 (2002)
(“[W]e find that the applicability of the . . . time limit rule is a matter
presumptively for the arbitrator, not the judge.”).
424. Id. at 84.
425. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (citing and describing the
numerous circuit court decisions which hold waiver by conduct an issue for the
courts to decide).
426. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225 cmt. a (1981).
427. Id. § 204.
428. Id. § 204 cmt. d.
429. See Zev v. Merman, 533 N.E.2d 669, 669 (N.Y. 1988) (“What constitutes
a reasonable time for performance depends upon the facts and circumstances of
the particular case.”); see also 1700 Rhinehart LLC v. Advance Am., 51 So.3d
535, 540 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (“[W]hen a contract fails to specify a
particular period, the law implies a reasonable time under the circumstances.”);
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however, have compiled a comprehensive list of factors in order to
provide a uniform, predicable approach to this inquiry.430
Particularly, the courts consider “the nature and object of the
contract, the previous conduct of the parties, the presence or
absence of good faith,” and the “possibility of prejudice or
hardship” to either party.431
First, the courts contemplate the nature and the object of the
contract in question by looking to its operative purpose, including
“all of the rules and procedures thereunder.”432 For example, the
delayed provision of “ministerial” services which bear little
significance on a party’s operations433 will be found much more
reasonable than delayed payments of property taxes required
under an option contract to purchase real property.434 Second,
courts will look to the parties’ prior conduct in order to determine
whether they were fulfilling their “contractual duties as
intended.”435 For example, one court found a two-week closing
period, set abruptly by a seller of real property after it delayed
closing for five years, unreasonable.436 Critical to its finding was
German v. Ford, 300 S.W.3d 692, 706 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (“The court will
usually imply a term requiring performance within a reasonable time under the
circumstances.”); O’Farrill Avila v. Gonzalez, 974 S.W.2d 237, 245 (Tex. App.
1998) (“Upon finding an essential term is missing, the trial judge, in implying
that term, is only to consider what was reasonable to the parties in light of the
circumstances . . . .”).
430. See Zev, 533 N.E.2d at 669.
431. Id.
432. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc. v. Liechtensteinische
Landesbank, 866 F. Supp. 114, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (considering the “deposit
rejection procedure” under the parties’ agreement); see Schober v. Hudson
Valley Humane Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Inc., 933 N.Y.S.2d
58, 59 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (considering “the unambiguous terms of the
stipulation settlement” between the parties); Bilotto v. Webber, 568 N.Y.S.2d
438, 439 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (considering the terms of a construction contract
between a builder and homeowners).
433. Smith Barney, 866 F. Supp. at 117.
434. See Parker v. Booker, 822 N.Y.S.2d 156, 158 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)
(“Since real property taxes by their nature are due on a particular day, the
reasonable date on which they were required to be paid is the date on which
they were due.”).
435. Smith Barney, 866 F. Supp. at 118.
436. See Knight v. McClean, 566 N.Y.S.2d 952, 954 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)
(describing the seller’s conduct which made the time that it set for performance
unreasonable).
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that the seller’s actions exhibited nothing more than a “desire to
avoid” performance of the contract as the parties intended.437
Third, courts consider the extent to which each party
performed its contractual obligations in good faith; that is,
whether each is acting in “consideration” of the other’s
interests.438 Indeed, a “covenant of good faith and fair dealing is
implied in all contracts,”439 and its meaning varies with the
circumstances.440
Generally,
however,
“good
faith
performance . . . emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common
purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the
other party.”441 Although particular acts of bad faith vary, two
notable instances are evading the “spirit” of the bargain and
willfully rendering “imperfect performance.”442 In the arbitral
context, for example, one court ordered a labor union to arbitrate
with an employer pursuant to an arbitration clause in the parties’
collective bargaining agreement.443 When the union attempted to
contest the tribunal’s jurisdiction, the court stated that parties to
an arbitration agreement “must live up to the spirit of their
agreement.”444 They “will not be permitted to take refuge in
subtle and adroit evasions in order to defeat the purposes of the
agreement.”445
Finally, the reasonableness inquiry will be affected by the
extent to which the delay in question prejudiced each party.446
For example, when a finding of unreasonable delay would cause
437. Id.
438. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc. v. Liechtensteinische
Landesbank, 866 F. Supp. 114, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
439. Smith v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 697 N.E.2d 168, 170 (N.Y. 1998).
440. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981) (“The
phrase ‘good faith’ is used in a variety of contexts, and its meaning varies
somewhat with the context.”).
441. Id.
442. Id. § 205 cmt. d.
443. Publishers’ Ass’n of N.Y. City v. N.Y. Newspaper Printing Pressmen’s
Union No. Two, 145 N.Y.S.2d 93, 96 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955) (noting that the union
contested
the
arbitrators’
jurisdiction
“because
the
[employee’s]
grievance . . . was ambiguous”).
444. Id. at 96.
445. Id. at 97.
446. See Zev v. Merman, 533 N.E.2d 669, 669 (N.Y. 1988) (noting prejudice
as a part of the multifactor reasonableness test).
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one party to suffer substantial losses while benefitting the other,
a court will be much less likely to find the delay unreasonable.447
Ultimately, New York’s reasonableness analysis provides a
stable, yet flexible framework to determine whether a party has
demanded arbitration within a reasonable time. Not all of the
factors need weigh in favor of unreasonableness to warrant such
a finding, and a strong implication of one factor often implicates
another.448 Furthermore, the test’s flexibility renders it applicable
to a myriad of contractual arrangements and circumstances.449
Therefore, this Note proposes that federal courts abandon the
waiver–forfeiture doctrine, and incorporate instead, through FAA
§ 2, New York courts’ multifactor approach as a reasonableness
test.450 Doing so will establish a uniform, predictable, doctrinally
accurate method to determine whether a party has lost its right
to arbitrate through pretrial conduct.

447. See Miller v. Almquist, 671 N.Y.S.2d 746, 750 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)
(refusing to find unreasonable delay where the buyers would have lost “their
opportunity to purchase” an apartment and their “$54,000 deposit,” while the
sellers would “have received the all-cash deal they had bargained for”).
448. See, e.g., Malley v. Malley, 861 N.Y.S.2d 149, 152 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)
(finding that the defendant was given an unreasonable time in which to perform
where a finding of reasonableness would have left the plaintiff’s “financial
position . . . the same,” but prejudiced the defendant severely); Parker v. Booker,
822 N.Y.S.2d 156, 158 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (finding unreasonable delay but no
bad faith); Knight v. McClean, 566 N.Y.S.2d 952, 954 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)
(finding that buyers were presented with an unreasonable time to perform
where “the previous conduct of the parties” was “[o]f significant importance”).
449. See, e.g., Malley, 861 N.Y.S.2d at 152 (applying the reasonableness test
to a real estate agreement entered as part of a judgment of divorce); Smith
Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc. v. Liechtensteinische Landesbank, 866 F.
Supp. 114, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (applying the reasonableness test to an
agreement established to “facilitate the settlement of securities transactions”);
Schober v. Hudson Valley Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Inc., 89
A.D.3d 715, 716 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (applying the reasonableness test to a
stipulation agreement entered in lieu of foreclosure).
450. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1901 (2009)
(stating that FAA § 2 “creates substantive federal law regarding the
enforceability of arbitration agreements,” in which traditional state principles of
contract law govern the analysis).
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3. A “Reasonable Time” to Demand Arbitration:
MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia

The Fourth Circuit’s decision in MicroStrategy, Inc. v.
Lauricia presents a useful paradigm to illustrate the efficacy of
the reasonableness test. Indeed, the impact of this approach is
best exemplified when compared against the strong prejudice
requirements propounded by the majority. Recall that in
MicroStrategy, Lauricia was terminated from her position as the
head of MicroStrategy’s Human Resources Department.451 Within
six months of her firing, MicroStrategy filed three separate
claims against Lauricia before demanding arbitration—one in
state court and two in federal court.452 Finally, although we are
told only that the parties “agreed” to the arbitral procedures in
question,453 let us assume that Lauricia, as a high level employee,
negotiated these procedures. At trial, the district court held that
MicroStrategy waived its right to arbitrate, finding that its
“remarkably aggressive” pretrial conduct and extensive discovery
prejudiced Lauricia.454
On appeal, let us assume the Fourth Circuit has replaced the
waiver doctrine with the reasonableness test. Thus, the question
before the court is whether MicroStrategy’s six-month delay in
demanding arbitration was unreasonable. If so, the court will
consider Lauricia’s duty to arbitrate discharged and continue
litigation; if not, then the court will stay further proceedings and
compel arbitration.
First, the relevant period in which to consider delay should
begin when a party files a claim in court because any delay
should coincide with pretrial conduct.455 Once that point is
identified, the court should begin its analysis by considering the
451. See MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244, 246 (4th Cir. 2001)
(discussing Lauricia’s employment at MicroStrategy).
452. See id. at 247–50 (discussing the claims and the time frame within
which MicroStrategy filed its claims against Lauricia).
453. Id. at 251.
454. Lauricia v. MicroStrategy, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 489, 492–93 (E.D. Va.
2000).
455. See supra Part II (discussing how conduct-based waiver has been the
focus of the circuits and the issue upon which the Supreme Court granted
certiorari).
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nature and object of the parties’ arbitration agreement. It should
do so, however, in light of the discrete benefits derived through
arbitration, and the inherent destabilizing effect of judicial
involvement.456 Further, the court should consider the nature of
the arbitral procedures for which the parties contracted. For
example, if the parties’ arbitration agreement provides for
expedited procedures, whether ad hoc or institutional,457 the court
should be far less willing to tolerate delay. In this hypothetical,
the arbitration clause requires only that the parties arbitrate
“any controversy or claim arising out of . . . th[e] Employee
Handbook.”458 Thus, although expedited arbitral review is not in
question, the inherent destabilization caused by the judicial
forum is important to keep in mind moving forward in the
analysis.
Next, the court should consider whether the parties’ prior
conduct manifests a desire to carry out the arbitration agreement
as intended. As the period for consideration begins when one
party files a claim, the court should consider which party first
filed the claim, the extent of the parties’ litigation activity, and
the nature of the parties’ relationship (i.e., whether they were
attempting to ameliorate their differences throughout the pretrial
process). First, it is particularly significant that MicroStrategy
filed three separate complaints after it learned of Lauricia’s
employment discrimination charges.459 Such conduct shows a
clear intent to avoid the arbitral forum, or perhaps that more
suspect motives are in play. Second, MicroStrategy engaged in
“remarkably aggressive” litigation conduct, as it deposed Laurcia,
seized a number of documents, obtained numerous responses to
interrogatories, and obtained Lauricia’s personal information, all
before demanding arbitration.460 Third, after MicroStrategy filed
456. See supra Part II (describing the benefits of arbitration).
457. For a useful example of expedited arbitral procedures, see AAA RULES,
supra note 58, at 42.
458. MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244, 246 (4th Cir. 2001)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
459. See id. at 246–48 (describing the complaints filed by MicroStrategy).
460. See id. at 254 (noting that “MicroStrategy deposed Lauricia,
successfully sought the seizure of documents, . . . received responses from
Lauricia to interrogatories and requests to produce, and obtained Lauricia’s
employment records from her former employers”).
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its first two claims, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission invited the parties to participate in a “conciliation
process.”461 Lauricia, however, declined the invitation and
requested that she be issued her “right-to-sue letter”
immediately.462 Thus, it is apparent that the parties’ relationship
had completely deteriorated by the time MicroStrategy demanded
arbitration. Ultimately, the above considerations show that
MicroStrategy had no desire to exercise the arbitration
agreement as intended—that is, to curb the costs and delays
appurtenant to litigation through mutually beneficial arbitral
procedures.463 Rather, it sought to exhaust Lauricia’s emotional
and economic reserves by manipulating the arbitral process.464 As
it is unlikely that Laurcia intended, or expected, this result,
MicroStrategy’s
conduct
drives
the
analysis
toward
unreasonableness.
Third, the court should consider the extent to which Lauricia
would suffer prejudice if MicroStrategy’s delay were found
reasonable. Conceptually, it is appropriate to maintain the
circuits’ notions of prejudice (i.e., costs, delay, and damage to a
party’s legal position through pretrial activity), as the other
factors in the reasonableness test inform these considerations.465
Critically, however, the court should consider expense and delay
alone, the very harms sought to be avoided through arbitration,466
sufficient to warrant a finding of prejudice.467 Therefore, it is
much more likely that Lauricia would be found prejudiced under
the reasonableness test. Although MicroStrategy’s six-month
delay was not particularly egregious, Lauricia was forced to
engage in substantial pretrial activity at great personal
461. Id. at 247.
462. Id.
463. See supra Part II (discussing the benefits derived, and expected,
through bargained-for arbitral procedures).
464. See MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244, 254 (4th Cir. 2001)
(describing how MicroStrategy, through its aggressive litigation conduct, sought
to “wear[] [Lauricia] out, both emotionally and financially”).
465. See supra Part III (discussing the various considerations encompassed
within each circuit’s prejudice analysis).
466. See supra Part II (discussing the benefits of arbitration).
467. See supra notes 279–80 and accompanying text (discussing the First
Circuit’s rationale for finding undue delay and costs, in and of themselves,
sufficient to warrant a finding of prejudice).
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expense.468 Despite the presence of prejudice under the
reasonableness test, however, let us assume that the court
refused to find prejudice for illustrative purposes.
The final step in the reasonableness test is to consider
whether a movant is attempting to exercise the arbitration
agreement in bad faith. In doing so, the court should keep in
mind that FAA § 3 allows recourse to the judicial forum.469 As
such, merely filing a claim should not trigger a finding of bad
faith. Rather, the court should deny only those demands which
contradict the “spirit,” or “defeat the purposes,” of the parties’
arbitration agreement.470 Other factors, such as the parties’ prior
conduct and the degree of prejudice suffered by the nonmovant,
should be informative. In this hypothetical, MicroStrategy’s
“remarkably aggressive” pretrial conduct is strongly indicative of
bad faith.471 It moved to compel arbitration only after inflicting
significant costs.472 Further, its aggressive use of pretrial
discovery evinced a willful desire to evade the arbitral framework
in favor of one more propitious to its cause.473 Therefore, the court
should find that MicroStrategy willfully evaded the spirit of the
parties’ agreement and, thus, exercised its arbitral rights in bad
faith. Indeed, such a finding should be strongly indicative, if not
dispositive, of unreasonable delay.474
468. See Lauricia, 268 F.3d at 250–51 (finding “no doubt” that
MicroStrategy’s pretrial conduct “involved the expenditure of substantial sums
of money by all involved”).
469. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2011) (permitting parties to stay judicial proceedings
pending arbitration, implying that some recourse to a judicial forum before
exercising arbitral rights is permissible).
470. Publishers’ Ass’n of N.Y. City v. N.Y. Newspaper Printing Pressmen’s
Union Number Two, 145 N.Y.S.2d 93, 96–97 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955).
471. MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244, 248 (4th Cir. 2001)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (1981) (citing “evasion of the spirit of the bargain” and
“willful rendering of imperfect performance” as particular examples of bad
faith).
472. See Lauricia, 268 F.3d at 250–51 (finding that Lauricia was forced to
pay “substantial sums of money” engaging in pretrial conduct).
473. See id. at 250, 254 (noting that, “[u]nder the rules by which the parties
agreed to arbitrate,” discovery was available but “under standards different
from those governing discovery in federal court,” particularly because the
arbitrator had more discretion to determine what materials were discoverable).
474. See, e.g., Smith v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 697 N.E.2d 168, 170 (N.Y.
1998) (finding per se liability for insurers who refuse settlement offers in bad
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Overall, although there was neither any prejudice nor
significant temporal delay, the court should find MicroStrategy’s
delayed performance unreasonable. Focusing squarely on the
parties’ pretrial conduct, it was clear that MicroStrategy did not
attempt to exercise its arbitral rights as intended. Further, its
conduct rose to the level of bad faith performance, as it willfully
turned cost-effective, stabilizing procedures into weapons of
financial malaise and delay. Therefore, the court should hold
Lauricia’s duty to arbitrate discharged under the reasonableness
test.
4. The Efficacy of the “Reasonableness Test” as Compared
to Waiver
The above paradigm illustrates how the reasonableness test
would improve upon the waiver doctrine in three key respects.
First, the reasonableness test would unify and standardize the
method for determining at what point a party, through pretrial
conduct, has lost its right to arbitrate. The test is fundamentally
aimed toward protecting parties’ legitimate, contractual
expectations. This unitary focus, coupled with the severability
doctrine’s magnifying effect, would center the analysis on
preserving the discrete benefits derived through arbitral
procedures—stability and predictability.475 The resulting
approach thus provides an analytic framework,476 capable of
uniform federal application,477 to which parties can look for
faith); Goodstein Constr. Corp. v. City of N.Y., 604 N.E.2d 1356, 1358–59 (N.Y.
1992) (finding that a cause of action based upon allegations of bad faith in the
real estate context are sufficient to entitle recovery for damages); Murphy v.
Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 91 (N.Y. 1983) (stating that, generally,
“an obligation of good faith and fair dealing on the part of a party to a contract
may be implied and, if implied will be enforced” (emphasis added)).
475. See supra Part II (describing how arbitration benefits parties’
underlying contractual arrangements).
476. See supra note 34 and accompanying test (describing how businesses
which use arbitration clauses in their contractual arrangements desire a stable,
“analytical framework” in order to facilitate both dispute resolution planning
and establishing arbitral procedures).
477. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1902 (2009) (stating
that FAA § 2 creates “substantive federal law” which incorporates traditional
state contract law principles).
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certainty when establishing arbitral procedures. Further, both
the prejudice and the rebuttal standards instill a complete lack of
focus, hinging parties’ arbitral rights on undefined standards of
pretrial conduct.478 Conversely, the reasonableness test
subordinates prejudice, making it a mere factor in a larger
analysis geared toward preserving parties’ expectations. Because
parties expect stability, courts would be far less likely to tolerate
dilatory “heads I win, tails you lose” pretrial strategies.479 If
courts effectively police such strategies, parties would be far less
likely to attempt them from the outset. Thus, by preventing
dilatory pretrial conduct, the reasonableness test would further
stabilize the arbitral process.
Second, the reasonableness test would realign the standard
for assessing parties’ pretrial conduct with FAA’s overarching
objective.480 First, its purely contractual methodology comports
with the notion that arbitration is simply a matter of contract.481
Both the discharge and the reasonableness concepts stem from
generally applicable contract law principles.482 Furthermore, the
reasonableness test is aimed directly toward upholding parties’
legitimate expectations, a “fundamental principal” of contract
law.483 To be sure, fewer disputes in all may be referred to
arbitration, at least in the short term. This would not, however,
contravene the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements. Rather, as the policy merely reflects FAA § 2’s
substantive mandate—enforcement of arbitration agreements as
contracts—the reasonableness test falls directly within its
confines.484 The circuits’ current analyses, however, do not.
478. See supra Part III (describing the circuit split and each circuit’s illdefined prejudice requirement).
479. See Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388,
391 (7th Cir. 1995).
480. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011)
(“The overarching purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure the enforcement of
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined
proceedings.”).
481. See id. at 1752 (“Arbitration is a matter of contract . . . .”).
482. See supra notes 421, 427–28 and accompanying text (discussing the
discharge and reasonableness principles under contract law).
483. Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A
Reply to Professor Summers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 497, 506 (1984).
484. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (“The FAA . . . places arbitration
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Indeed, parties can neither waive nor forfeit an autonomous
contract, the very regard in which arbitration agreements are
held under the severability doctrine. Thus, both standards
propound approaches clearly rejected by contract law and, as a
result, the FAA.485
Furthermore, endless litigation over the details of
prejudice,486 or rebuttal, impugns the FAA’s second underlying
goal—to “facilitate streamlined proceedings.”487 Under the
reasonableness test, however, disputes deemed referable to
arbitration would be both contractually legitimate (i.e., tested
against bad faith) and consigned expeditiously under a
predictable framework. Thus, the reasonableness test would
unite the FAA’s two goals, rather than frustrate both of them—a
result clearly favored by the Supreme Court.488 Ultimately, the
reasonableness framework accomplishes the FAA’s overarching
objective to a greater extent than waiver both doctrinally and
efficaciously.
Third and finally, the reasonableness test would prevent bad
faith manipulation of the arbitral process. Indeed, bargained-for
arbitral procedures confer significant benefits upon parties’
contractual relationships.489 Ensuring that parties exercise their
arbitral rights in good faith, a requirement of all contractual
arrangements,490 will ensure that they receive the benefit of their
agreements on an equal footing with other contracts . . . .” (citations omitted));
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625
(1985) (“The liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements . . . is at
bottom a policy guaranteeing the enforcement of private contractual
arrangements . . . .”).
485. See supra Part IV (discussing the doctrinal inaccuracies of applying the
waiver doctrine and forfeiture in the context of analyzing a party’s arbitral
rights).
486. See Erdman Co. v. Phoenix Land & Acquisition, LLC, 650 F.3d 1115,
1120 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding that requiring parties to “litigate endlessly over the
details of prejudice” makes little sense in certain circumstances).
487. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011).
488. See id. at 1749 (stating explicitly that its holding causes the FAA’s two
goals to coincide, but eschewing the dissent’s approach in that it “would
frustrate both of them” (emphasis in original)).
489. See supra Part II (discussing the benefits derived through established
arbitral procedures).
490. See supra note 439 and accompanying text (noting that a covenant of
good faith and fair dealing is implied in all contractual arrangements).
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bargain in accordance with contract law.491 Thus, the
reasonableness test provides not only a doctrinally accurate
approach, but an equitable approach.
VI. Conclusion
Arbitration is, quite simply, a matter of contract.492 It is “a
private process to which the parties have agreed, and the courts’
only obligation is to uphold that agreement pursuant to
established arbitration and contract law.”493 Despite this
obligation’s intrinsic simplicity, the Circuit Courts of Appeals
have consistently failed to uphold arbitration agreements as
contracts, often to the detriment of parties’ arbitral rights. They
have yanked the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration from
its contractual roots,494 and use it to justify doctrinally
inaccurate,495 manipulative results.496
The Supreme Court has recently stated that the FAA’s
overarching objective is “to enforce arbitration agreements
according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined
proceedings.”497 The reasonableness test proposed by this Note is
precisely what the Supreme Court requires—a purely contractual
approach which accomplishes the FAA’s objective. Further, it
provides a comprehensive framework which would unify the
circuit courts’ analyses and stabilize the arbitral process in
491. See Burton, supra note 483, at 506 (stating that ensuring parties’
legitimate expectations is a fundamental aspect of contract law).
492. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (noting
that arbitration is “simply a matter of contract between the parties”).
493. Charles Smith, The Application of Due Process to Arbitration Awards of
Punitive Damages—Where is State Action?, 2007 J. DISP. RESOL. 417, 419.
494. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 625 (1985) (noting that the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements “is at bottom a policy guaranteeing the enforcement of private
contractual arrangements”).
495. See supra Part IV (describing why waiver, under contract law, is the
incorrect approach to determine when a party has, through pretrial conduct, lost
its right to arbitrate).
496. See supra notes 266–68 and accompanying text (describing how the
circuits which impose burdensome prejudice requirements consciously
acknowledge the manipulative strategies perpetuated by those requirements).
497. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011).
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accordance with parties’ legitimate expectations.498 Under this
approach, arbitration will remain, simply, a matter of contract.

498. See supra Part II (discussing how the stabilizing effect provided by
bargained-for arbitral procedures is lost without a predictable legal framework).

